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Abstract
This report describes the outcome of a workshop (the Mutual Joint Visit for Seveso Inspections) 
hosted by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment of the Netherlands in November 2006  on 
“enforcement in Seveso II enterprises” in particular, a subject that has never been dealt with at EU 
level before.  The “Table of Eleven” was used as model in order to facilitate and encourage discus-
sion.  The Table of Eleven is a model based on behavioural sciences consisting of eleven dimensions, or 
factors, which are decisive for the level of compliance with legislation.  The use of the Table of Eleven 
requires the definition of and focus on “target groups” and “rules’’.  Five specific target groups were 
selected:  Mineral oil refineries, the pharmaceutical industry, fertilizer production, chemical batch 
processing, and LPG storage.  Five specific rules were selected:  1) “The requirement of submitting a 
notification” (ref. Article 6 sub 1); 2) “Major accident scenarios” (ref. Article 9 and Annex II sub IVa); 
3) “Assessment of the extent and severity of consequences” (ref. Article 9 and Annex II sub IVb); 4) 
“The identification of training needs” (ref. Article 7, 9 and Annex III sub c.i); and 5) “Procedures for 
management of change” (ref. Article 7, 9 and Annex III sub c.iv).  The workshops discussions produced 
several interesting and useful conclusions concerning the enforceability of the Seveso Directive in 
general, and differences in compliance drivers in different sectors and across the Member States.  On 
the basis of these conclusions, several recommendations were generated for European, national and 
inspectorate level regarding the improvement of enforcement strategies, tools and the results of the 
analyses performed in this workshop overall and by industry sector and by rule.
Disclaimer
The main purpose of the document is to provide a collection of knowledge representing the state of 
practice in the EU in the expectation that it will aid Seveso inspectors and inspections programmes in 
reviewing and improving their performance as appropriate.  It is understood that several approaches 
to controlling major hazards may be equally effective and the document is not offered as a definitive 
assessment of all possible options in this regard.  Moreover, the editors note that where informa-
tion is provided on a practice applied in a particular country it has been provided with the view that 
this might be useful descriptive information.  However, the document does not intend to represent 
a complete description of any one country’s inspection practices since they often differ internally 
between regions and sometimes between competent authorities who share Seveso inspection
responsibilities.
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Preface
The inspection function has always been considered one of the most powerful and dynamic 
tools available to Member State authorities for enforcement of the Seveso II Directive. For this 
reason, the European Commission along with competent authorities responsible for Seveso II 
implementation have long held this area as a priority for EU level technical cooperation. There 
is a strongly shared commitment to continuing to work together to increase the effectiveness 
of inspection practices and to ensure a consistent approach with respect to interpreting Seveso 
requirements through inspections across the Member States.
The Seveso Inspections Series is intended to be a set of publications reflecting conclusions and 
key points from technical exchanges, research and analyses on topics relevant to the effective 
implementation of the inspection requirements of the Seveso II Directive. These publications 
are intended to facilitate the sharing of information about Member States’ experiences and 
practices for the purpose of fostering greater effectiveness, consistency and transparency in 
the implementation of Article 18 of the Directive. The series is managed by the European 
Commission’s Technical Working Group on Seveso II Inspections (TWG 2), consisting 
of inspectors appointed by members of the Committee of the Competent Authorities for 
Implementation of the Seveso II Directive (CCA) to represent Seveso inspection programmes 
throughout the European Union. The Technical Working Group is coordinated by the Major 
Accident Hazards Bureau of the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre with the 
support of DG Environment. 
This publication, “Enforcement of Seveso II: An Analysis of Compliance Drivers and Barriers in 
Five Industrial Sectors”, is one of a series of publications that form part of the Seveso Inspections 
Publication Series. The publication series is one of a number of initiatives currently in place or 
in development to support implementation of the Directive and sponsored at EU level. In 
particular, a prime source of content for publications in this series is the Mutual Joint Visit 
(MJV) Programme for Seveso II Inspections. Launched in 1999, the European Commission’s 
MJV Programme was intended to serve as a vehicle for promoting technical exchange among 
Member State Seveso II inspectors. The aim of the programme was to encourage the sharing and 
adoption of best practices for inspections through a system of regular information exchange. 
The visits would be hosted by different Member States (hence visits would be “mutual”) and 
targeted for working inspectors of other Member States (and thereby “joint” visits) charged 
with assessing compliance with the Seveso II Directive in industrial installations. The MJV 
Programme is managed by the Major Accident Hazards Bureau in consultation with the TWG 
on Seveso II Inspections. 
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Since 2005 the MJV programme has encouraged visits focusing on topics of specific interest 
for Seveso inspections as identified by the Technical Working Group. To the greatest extent 
possible, the conclusions and observations of inspectors participating in these workshops will 
be published as part of the Seveso Inspections Series.
The mission of the TWG is to identify and recommend actions to promote exchange of 
information and collaborative research among the Member States for improving the quality and 
consistency of implementation of Seveso II obligations within the Seveso inspection authorities. 
The results of these efforts may also be published separately on the Seveso Inspections website, 
or combined with MJV summaries in the Seveso Inspections Series. 
For more information on Seveso inspections, please visit http://sevesoinspections.jrc.it. This site 
and the MAHB website (http://mahbsrv.jrc.it) contain useful references to Seveso legislation, 
its implementation and related risk management and assessment projects.
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Executive summary
In November 2006 the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment of the Netherlands organized 
the 16th Mutual Joint Visit (MJV) for Seveso Inspections. This MJV was the third “Phase 2” 
MJV, following two previous MJVs focused on inspections in petroleum storage (Brussels) 
and refinery (UK) industries. This MJV addressed the topic of “enforcement in Seveso 
II enterprises” in particular, a subject that has never been dealt with at EU level before. In 
addition to typical enforcement issues, it was expected that organization, cooperation and 
responsibilities of different regulatory authorities in enforcement could be important issues in 
EU-level discussions of this topic. The national context and/or regional differences could also 
enter into the discussion. The goal of the MJV was to answer the following questions:
1. What are the differences and similarities with regard to enforcement in Seveso II 
companies in the different Member States? The focus in this respect was on preparing 
information and recommendations to support more consistent compliance within the 
Member States.
2. What kind of intervention strategies may be applicable in the area of Seveso II 
enforcement? With regard to this question, the focus was on identifying proactive 
tools for improving compliance, such as the use of peer pressure or communication.
The MJV was prepared by a team which consisted of two members from the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Employment of the Netherlands and a number of representatives from the Technical 
Working Group on Seveso II Inspections (TWG 2). 
Prior to the MJV, a questionnaire was sent to all participants. The goal of the questionnaire 
was to fine-tune the programme of the MJV and to gain an informative insight into the context 
of Seveso enforcement within the different EU Member States. It was aimed at identifying 
organizational similarities and differences between Member States as well as at obtaining 
personal insight into the work area of colleagues abroad. This information could potentially 
lead to cross-pollination on particular items or ideas. The results of the questionnaire were 
used to divide the participants into five working groups.
During the MJV, the “Table of Eleven” was used as model in order to facilitate and encourage 
discussion. The Table of Eleven is a model based on behavioural sciences consisting of eleven 
dimensions, or factors, which are decisive for the level of compliance with legislation. The 
model can help map the strong and weak points of enforcement of and compliance with a 
specific rule. In this way, it can be used to design new and/or evaluate existing legislation. The 
use of the Table of Eleven requires the definition of and focus on “target groups” and “rules’’.
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Five specific target groups were selected:
1. Mineral oil refinery
2. Pharmaceutical industry
3. Fertilizers production
4. Batch processing and chemicals
5. LPG storage
Five specific rules were selected:
1. “The requirement of submitting a notification” (ref. Article 6 sub 1);
2. “Major accident scenarios” (ref. Article 9 and Annex II sub IVa);
3. “Assessment of the extent and severity of consequences” (ref. Article 9 and Annex II 
sub IVb);
4. “The identification of training needs” (ref. Article 7, 9 and Annex III sub c.i);
5. “Procedures for management of change” (ref. Article 7, 9 and Annex III sub c.iv).
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Conclusions and Recommendations
The MJV led to of the following general conclusions and recommendations about Member State 
approaches to enforcement: 
	 Except for implementation of some rules and the direct or indirect use 
of classical interventions, limited differences are found between Member 
States. These differences seem to depend, on the one hand, on the “age” of the 
Member State as part of the European Union and, on the other, on cultural differences. 
Enforcement in “new” Member States appears to be based mainly on respect on the 
part of enterprises towards the authorities. The authority involved plays a relatively 
leading role with regard to the rules and means to be applied as well as the goals to be 
achieved. In “experienced” Members States, by contrast, the authority involved tends 
to focus on enforcement with regard to (management) processes and (common) goals 
rather than on the means and methods to be used. All Member States, however, deal 
with multiple interpretations of rules, the carrying out of joint inspections, the design 
of inspection methods and the required level of training and knowledge on the part of 
inspectors.
	 All Member States deal with multiple interpretations of rules, perform joint 
inspections and cope with the associated challenges of coordination and the 
(continuous) updating and improving of inspection methods. Most Member 
States recognize the necessity of training for inspectors, the need to possess and 
enhance knowledge of particular enterprises or industrial processes, and the desire to 
exchange information and “best practices” in order to learn from equivalent European 
authorities.
	 Self-compliance, image and reputation are a major driver for many 
companies, but this aspect is not yet integrated in authorities’ enforcement 
strategies. Comparing the different target groups studied, reputation and public 
image is an important issue for large, multinational industries with products used 
by the public. Enterprises having a good Environment, Health and Safety (EHS) 
staff with a lot of knowledge will also have a better level of compliance. This factor 
makes a significant contribution to spontaneous compliance and a reduction in the 
enforcement effort required. On an operational level, the use of sanctions on the 
“reputation and image” of enterprises is a possibility to stimulate compliance.   
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	 A challenge lies in improving the clarity and enforceability of rules, for 
example “hard” versus “soft1” rules. Companies having a good EHS staff with a 
lot of knowledge will also manifest better compliance levels. Smaller companies tend to 
have more problems with new, unclear rules and are more dependent on information 
from the authorities. “Soft” rules, i.e., where performance is usually measured in 
qualitative terms, for example “the identification of training needs” often have to 
be elaborated. There is no general, uniform elaboration of soft rules.   
	 The level of knowledge and training of inspectors influences the 
probability of inspection and the probability of violations being 
detected during inspections. A profile of industrial expertise and adequate 
competence is required for inspectors to be recognized as counterparts for 
industry. In particular it is recommended to have multinational enterprises 
inspected and their compliance enforced by experienced inspectors.  
	 Information exchange between inspectors both at national and European 
level is a mechanism for keeping inspectors and inspection programmes 
informed about good inspection and safety practices. Modern communication 
tools can be exploited to overcome the challenge of effecting an exchange of experiences 
and good practices between Member States. Moreover, MJVs have a important added 
value in terms of their ability to provide an inventory of common problems relating to 
Seveso regulations and as a forum for discussing potential solutions. The exchange of 
information between Member States can be stimulated in a number of ways, for example, 
by development of appropriate websites, elaboration of a high quality Frequently Asked 
Questions (FAQ) document, the provision of guidance on good practices of other 
Member States and actively informing all parties involved. 
	 On a European level, it was recommended that the enforceability of 
legislation should be a subject which legislators take into account. Within this 
recommendation the following key points were also underlined:
–	 Experienced inspectors and industrial representatives can be of great value in the 
legislative process due to their specialised knowledge and experience and kept 
informed, they can also help to secure greater public support. 
–	 A lack of consistency of Member State enforcement standards and practices 
continues also to undermine enforceability. Inconsistencies could be mitigated 
1  In this document the terms “hard” and “soft” rules refer to obligations in terms of the ease with which performance 
of the obligation can be observed and measured. Compliance with hard rules can generally be measured objectively, 
for example, through quantitative methods or comparison with clear and widely accepted standards. In contrast soft 
rules are defined by the absence of an objective standard to which performance can be compared. Sometimes the 
qualitative nature of a rule makes compliance particularly hard to define but performance measures and specialized 
verification methods can sometimes be developed to overcome this problem.
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through agreement on or development of common technical references, for 
example:
o	 Guidance documents pertaining to the “soft”, that is qualitative, parts of 
the applicable legislation could aid in reducing differences. 
o	 Promoting ISO certification of safety management systems could also 
reduce inconsistencies in the interpretation of this particular requirement. 
o	 Standard inspection methods at international level could be established 
and adapted for national and local use. .
	 Effective enforcement is often hampered by national level challenges, such 
as resource limitations and lack of clear criteria for enforcing soft rules. 
Enforceability of legislation is critical in terms of preventing enforcement problems at 
the source. Implementation of European Union Directives is sometimes fragmented and 
“cluttered” with other rules because of existing legislation on the subject. Moreover, 
maintaining an inspections programme empowered with an adequate budget and 
competent staff to enforce the Directive is essential. In line with these concepts, the 
MJV made the following specific suggestions:
o	 National authorities should make as much use of European Union guidelines as 
possible when implementing, explaining and interpreting the new rules.
o	 Certification – after examination – of inspectors is an option. Some of the 
inspectorates are already certified according to ISO 9000. Certification (of 
inspectors or companies) might help in raising the importance of training and 
qualified inspectors. Some countries (e.g. England) already have certification systems 
and certificates for inspectors; a new certificate (“within other certificates”) may 
create chaos.
o	 The quality of inspection services may also be improved by setting national minimum 
requirements for inspectors with regard to knowledge and experience.
o	 The inspectorates should have adequate capacity, methods and knowledge to 
perform effective physical inspections.
	 Understanding the typical compliance profiles of different industrial sectors 
may also assist inspectorates in developing more effective enforcement 
strategies, for example: 
o	 Public perception and company concerns about reputation should be factored into 
enforcement strategies and sanctioning.
o	 Multinational companies should be inspected by experienced inspectors. It is 
important for all inspections that the inspectors carrying them out have a thorough 
understanding of what it is they are inspecting.
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1. Introduction
In November 2006 the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment of the Netherlands organized 
the 16th Mutual Joint Visit (MJV) for Seveso II inspectors. This MJV was the third “Phase 2” MJV 
following two previous MJVs focused on inspections in petroleum storage (Brussels) and refinery 
(UK) industries. This Dutch MJV addressed the topic of “enforcement in Seveso II enterprises” 
in particular, a subject that has never been dealt with at the EU level before. In addition to 
typical enforcement issues, it was expected that organization, cooperation and responsibilities 
of different regulatory authorities (e.g. those which issue environmental permits, fire brigades) 
in enforcement could be potentially important issues in EU-level discussions of this topic. The 
national context and/or regional differences could also enter into the discussion.
1.1 Importance of enforcement for Seveso II
In her opening speech at the MJV, the Director-General of the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment, Ms Hilgersom, formulated the importance of the subject as follows:
“Chances of a major accident are small compared to accident rates in other industrial fields. 
However, if an accident happens, the consequences are huge and shocking. We have all seen the 
smoke plume of Buncefield on television or in the newspaper, the crater of Toulouse and the 
devastation in Enschede in the Netherlands, where a fireworks factory exploded 6 years ago. 
Often lives are lost or people are seriously injured, not only on the industrial site itself, but also 
in the surrounding area. The environment may sustain heavy damage, and material costs often 
run into millions of euros. The impact of these kinds of accidents on society is enormous.
Fortunately, most of the time, the chain of risk control works and accidents are effectively 
prevented. But we constantly have to be alert. And here also lies a danger: how to keep your 
attention and the operator’s attention continuously focused, even after a year of no reportable 
incidents? Or after two years?
It is the belief that the key to the solution is to always keep optimizing all processes that 
ensures safety. Do not waste resources on strategies that are not effective, but always keep 
asking questions: do I achieve the desired effect? Can it be done in a more effective way? This 
is not only valid for the operator, but also for the way authorities perform their part within 
the framework of Seveso II legislation. Everyone agrees that the operator should take effective 
measures to ensure safety in his plant and that he should always check whether the measures 
taken are indeed effective. It is therefore not unreasonable to ask the same kind of effort from 
the authorities. Are the Seveso inspectors also effective in their enforcement strategy? 
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When talking about enforcement strategies, the broadest sense of the word is meant. The 
classical way of enforcement, for instance by financial penalties or prosecution, should of 
course always be available if the situation requires. But perhaps different, “softer”2 enforcement 
strategies, such as using and promoting industries’ own codes and standards or clarification of 
the legislation’s requirements, could be even more effective. 
On the other hand, it is crucial for the authorities to determine the core Articles in the Seveso 
II regulations, the level of compliance with these Articles which may be deemed acceptable, and 
what the actual level of compliance is in the industry concerned. These are the tasks that must 
be faced on the way to effective enforcement.
The MJV is intended to stimulate participants to find new ways for providing better safety in the 
major hazard industry and to exchange good practices. There will be differences between the 
EU countries. Some of the participants have been used to similar legislation for several years, 
others are relatively new to the Seveso II approach. The intention is to combine strengths: 
using the benefits of both the experienced and the fresh approach. It is also interesting to know 
the similarities and shared problems of all participants regarding enforcement.
The great challenge will be to find new and creative ways to keep all people involved focused on 
the continuous danger, even when safety has reached a fairly high level.”
1.2 Goal
The goal of the MJV was to answer the following questions:
1.	 What	are	the	differences	and	similarities	with	regard	to	enforcement	in	Seveso	II	companies	
in	the	different	Member	States?
The focus was on preparing information and recommendations to support more 
consistent compliance within the Member States.
2.	 What	 kind	 of	 intervention	 strategies	 may	 be	 applicable	 in	 the	 area	 of	 Seveso	 II	
enforcement?
With regard to this question, the focus was on identifying proactive tools for improving 
compliance, such as the use of peer pressure or communication.
2  “Soft” enforcement strategies refer to indirect methods that an authority can use to improve compliance such as the 
provision of clear criteria and guidance, establishment of merit programs, or the threat of bad publicity. By contrast, 
“hard” enforcement strategies consist of the usual punitive measures as defined by the law, such as warning letters, 
fines and injunctions.
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1.3 Organization and programme
The MJV was prepared by a team which consisted of two members from the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Employment of the Netherlands and a number of representatives from the 
Technical Working Group on Seveso II Inspections (TWG 2). A facilitation team supported 
this preparation team. 
In the preparation process, the goals for the MJV were set and the tools to achieve these goals 
were chosen. For fine-tuning the MJV programme and to gain an informative insight into the 
background of participants and differences in organization of Seveso enforcement within the 
Member States, a questionnaire was sent to all participants prior to the MJV.
To target and promote discussions among the participants during the MJV, the “Table of Eleven” 
tool was used. This is a behaviour analysis model used to obtain a picture of the motives for 
compliance or non-compliance with a specific	rule in a specific	target	group. The Table of Eleven 
consists of eleven dimensions which together play a decisive role in determining the extent to 
which compliance with rules is achieved. The dimensions can be used to assess whether it is 
possible to enforce and comply with existing legislation. More information on the model is given 
in section 3.2 and Annex 5 of this report. The usability of the Table of Eleven to facilitate discussions 
was evaluated during the MJV. The results of this evaluation are reported in Annex 6.
The 3-day programme of the MJV is given in Annex 1. The participants, listed in Annex 2, 
represented 18 Member States, Croatia as candidate country and Norway. The group was divided 
into 5 working groups, each with a chairperson and a secretary. To support the discussions in 
working groups, a number of industrial representatives and/or technical advisors were assigned 
to each group. During the MJV, some adjustments were made in close consultation with the 
working group chairpersons. Finally, the working groups presented their conclusions and a 
plenary discussion was held to draw more general conclusions. In addition, the draft version of 
the report was distributed to the participants.
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1.4 Contents of this report
The results and minutes of the MJV are given in this report.
•	 Description of applied methods and working groups
•	 Results of the questionnaire
•	 Results of working group discussions specified per
o	 Target group
o	 Rule discussed
o	 Intervention strategy
•	 General conclusions 
•	 Recommendations on European, national and inspector level
Several Annexes have been attached.
•	 1: the programme 
•	 2: a list of participants
•	 3: a list of the working groups 
•	 4: the model questionnaire
•	 5: details of the Table of Eleven
•	 6: evaluation results on the usefulness of the Table of Eleven
•	 7-11: the results of the five working groups
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2. Methods and structure
In this chapter, the methods, tools and structure of the MJV are elaborated upon. In particular 
these were the questionnaire that was sent to all participants prior to the MJV, the “Table of 
Eleven” as a discussion tool and basis of methodological analyses, and the “working groups, 
target groups and rules” organizing principle to provide structure and focus for the discussions 
conducted.
2.1 The questionnaire
Prior to the MJV, a questionnaire was sent to all participants. The goal of the questionnaire 
was to fine-tune the programme of the MJV and to gain an informative insight into the context 
of Seveso enforcement within the different EU Member States. It was aimed at identifying 
organizational similarities and differences between Member States as well as at obtaining 
personal insight into the work area of colleagues abroad. This information could potentially 
lead to cross-pollination on particular items or ideas. The results of the questionnaire were 
used to divide the participants into five working groups. 
The questionnaire, given in Annex 4, consists of 6 main questions:
1. Which authority is primarily responsible?
2. Who are the other competent authorities?
3. How are authorities organized and coordinated?
4. What are the prime responsibilities of competent authorities?
5.	 How is the Seveso II Directive implemented?
6.	 What is the knowledge and experience of participants?
The results of the questionnaire are reported in section 3.1 of this report.
2.2 The Table of Eleven
The government wants to effect changes in society by influencing the behaviour of citizens and 
businesses. One of the policy tools that the government can use to achieve this aim is legislation. 
With the aid of rules, the government can create limits as to what citizens and businesses can 
and cannot do. Legislation, however, also assumes some level of compliance on the part of the 
target group. Non-compliance decreases the chance of realizing the policy objective. Moreover, 
legislation is also meant to be complied with: compliance maintains the legal nature of society 
and non-compliance affects that nature.
In 1994, the Dutch Ministry of Justice studied the possibility of periodically monitoring the level 
of compliance with legislation. It was during this project that the Table of Eleven came into being. 
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Within the Dutch government, legislators, policymakers and enforcers now broadly use this 
method. 
The Table of Eleven is a model based on behavioral sciences consisting of eleven dimensions, or 
factors, which are decisive for the level of compliance with legislation. The model can help map 
the strong and weak points of enforcement of and compliance with a specific rule. In this way, 
it can be used to design new and/or evaluate existing legislation. 
When analyzing compliance behavior with the aid of the Table of Eleven, it is important to 
have a clear idea of the target group and the legislation to be tested. The term “target group” 
refers to the persons or organizations (businesses) that must abide by a given set of rules. 
The legislation to be tested, however, may be applicable to several target groups. For the 
practicability of a Table of Eleven analysis, it is recommended that users opt for one target 
group and one or more “core violations” of the legislation to be tested. Core violations are 
understood to mean violations which have a bearing on the heart of the legislation concerned 
and which may undermine the policy objective of the Act if they occur on a large scale. 
The Table of Eleven comprises eleven dimensions to assess compliance with legislation. These 
dimensions are divided into two groups:
1. Spontaneous compliance dimension group:
 Factors contributing to spontaneous compliance without any governmental pressure or 
activities like inspection. These factors are:
•	 Knowledge of the rule(s)
•	 Advantages/disadvantages of (non-)compliance
•	 Degree of acceptance of the rule
•	 Faithfulness of the target group
•	 Non-official control
2. Enforcement dimension group:
 Enforcement-activity factors contributing to compliance with the rule. These factors are:
•	 Risk of being reported
•	 Risk of inspection 
•	 Risk of detection of non-compliance 
•	 Selectivity of inspections
•	 Risk of a sanction being imposed
•	 Severity of the sanction
The choice for this divisionThis structure was selected was made because it is easiest to 
recognize shows how different drivers can be viewed from the perspective of the groups from 
the perspectives of compliance and enforcement. Here, “enforcement” means any government 
activity aimed at encouraging compliance with legislation.
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With the Table of Eleven idea, the user applies the broad definition of the enforcement 
concept, which does not only relate to the government carrying out inspections and imposing 
sanctions (enforcement in the restricted sense). Other activities, such as providing information 
and organizing informal control structures are named in the Table of Eleven. They directly 
anticipate the spontaneous compliance dimensions and are therefore very important for the 
purpose of preventative enforcement. 
In the Dutch version of the Table of Eleven, a list of possible interventions for each of the eleven 
dimensions is given. Although this list only applies to the Dutch cultural situation, it can also be 
used for the discussion about intervention strategies.
 
A full description of the Table of Eleven method is given in Annex 5.
2.3 Working groups
When using the Table of Eleven to discuss and evaluate the enforcement of Seveso II legislation, 
the discussions should focus on specific target groups and specific rules. The organization of the 
working groups is explained in this section.
2.3.1 Specific target groups
For the working group discussions based on the Table of Eleven, the specific target groups were 
defined as groups of businesses with similar characteristics.
In total, five specific target groups were selected with differences in “maturity”, size and 
culture:
1. Mineral oil refinery
2. Pharmaceutical industry
3. Fertilizers production
4. Batch processing and chemicals
5. LPG storage
The preparation team of the MJV expected clear differences in enforcement between these 
selected groups of businesses. Each working group of the MJV discussed only one specific target 
group. To facilitate and enrich the discussion, the working groups were free to further define 
the target group (e.g. upper/lower-tier site, multinational company, number of employees). The 
definition of the target groups is given in the report of each working group. The full reports are 
attached as Annexes 7-11.
Each working group had a chairperson to lead the discussions and a secretary to make notes, 
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facilitate the discussion and prepare the working group report. If possible, an industrial 
representative and/or a technical advisor with knowledge of the target group was also assigned 
to the working group. The composition of the working groups is shown in Annex 3. 
2.3.2 Specific rules
The Seveso II Directive consists of different kinds of rules at both the organizational (safety 
management system) and technical (calculation, technical measures) level as well as specific 
rules on what and how to report to the authorities. The preparation team of the MJV selected 
five specific, enforcement-related rules on which the discussions within the working groups 
were to focus.
The rules selected were:
1. “The requirement of submitting a notification” (ref. Article 6 sub 1);
2. “Major accident scenarios” (ref. Article 9 and Annex II sub IVa);
3. “Assessment of the extent and severity of consequences” (ref. Article 9 and Annex 
II sub IVb);
4. “The identification of training needs” (ref. Article 7, 9 and Annex III sub c.i);
5. “Procedures for management of change” (ref. Article 7, 9 and Annex III sub c.iv).
In the working group sessions during the MJV, each working group had to address at least two 
of the pre-selected rules. Depending on the time remaining, a choice could then be made to 
discuss one of the other pre-selected rules or, if agreed by the group, another equally relevant 
rule. 
To make sure each pre-selected rule was discussed at least once by one of the groups, the 
following discussion sequence was imposed:
Working group Specific rules sequence
Compulsory Voluntary
1. Mineral oil refinery 1 2 3 4 5 Case
2. Pharmaceutical industry 5 1 2 3 4 Case
3. Fertilizers production 4 5 1 2 3 Case
4. Batch processing 3 4 5 1 2 Case
5. LPG storage 2 3 4 5 1 Case
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2.3.3 Intervention strategies
One of the goals of this MJV was to gather information and ideas about intervention strategies 
for the areas in which compliance with the rules is weak. These intervention strategies could 
vary from classic enforcement strategies to “softer” intervention tools. Discussion was 
launched with the help of the intervention strategy list of the Table of Eleven. Ideas to improve 
the weak points as identified in the working group discussions were then gathered. The type 
and effectiveness of intervention strategies could vary between Member States. A collective 
review and exchange of the results of the working group discussions, in a plenary session at the 
end of the meeting, also resulted in some general recommendations for improvement of Seveso 
enforcement in the EU as a whole.
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3. Results
The results of the MJV on enforcement of Seveso II are summarized in this chapter. The first 
part reports the findings of the questionnaire, followed by a description of the working group 
discussion results.
 
3.1 Questionnaire
Prior to the MJV, participants from 18 Member States, Norway and Croatia, i.e. ,about 90% 
of the possible total, sent completed questionnaires to the preparation team of the MJV. The 
results of these questionnaires were analyzed per question.
1. Which authority is primarily responsible?
In eight (40%) of the participating EU Member States, the Ministry of Environment (including 
Spatial Planning, Environment, Housing and Environmental Protection) is primarily responsible 
for the enforcement of Seveso II.
In the other twelve participating States (60%), the authority primarily responsible for Seveso II 
implementation was indicated as being:
•	 2x Ministry of Social Affairs/Employment 
•	 1x Ministry of Interior (Disaster Management, Civil Protection and Emergency 
Planning)
•	 1x State Fire Service 
•	 2x Ministry of Trade and Industry/Economy 
•	 3x HSE Executive/HSE Authority/ Industrial Safety Directorate
•	 1x Ministry of Local Defence 
•	 1x Ministry of Justice and Police
•	 1x Local Government and Regional Development
2. Who are the other competent authorities?
The primarily responsible authority communicates with, on average, 4 to 5 other competent 
authorities.
The competent authorities identified as cooperating most in joint enforcement were noted as follows:
•	 All: Local authorities (counties, municipalities, etc)
•	 65% Ministry of Social Affairs/Employment
•	 55% Ministry of Interior/Civil Protection/Emergency Planning
•	 50% State Fire Service, Fire & Rescue Services Agency
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•	 45% Ministry of Spatial Planning/Environment/Environmental Protection (Agency)
•	 10% Safety /Security organization
•	 5% Police 
•	 5% Port authorities
For particular industries or risks, some Member States also cooperate with dedicated 
authorities or groups:
•	 Petroleum Safety Authority (Norway)
•	 Explosives and Pipelines (Belgium)
•	 Seveso Experts’ Group (Austria)
•	 Hungarian Trade Licensing Office (Hungary)
3. How are authorities organized and coordinated?
All participating Member States have a coordinating competent authority (supervisory/HSE). 50% 
of the participating Member States have dedicated authorities for particular industries or risks: 
•	 Petroleum Safety Authority (Norway)
•	 Explosives and Pipelines (Belgium)
•	 Seveso Experts’ Group (Austria)
•	 Hungarian Trade Licensing Office (Hungary)
•	 Regional Technical Committee
•	 Industrial Safety Group 
4. What are the prime responsibilities of competent authorities?
Primary responsibilities at national level (or delegated to local/regional level) are: 
•	 Implementation
•	 Supervision
•	 Coordination
•	 Providing guidance
•	 Preparation of the inspection plan (at strategic level)
Responsibilities of local authorities or regional offices (of national authorities) are generally: 
•	 Coordination of (joint) inspections
•	 Issuing permits
•	 Enforcement (on tactical, operational level)
In some Member States coordination is also managed at national level; for upper-tier 
establishments, for example. 
In most inspection teams, team members are responsible solely for the inspection activities 
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within their respective scope of authority, such as: 
•	 Occupational Health and Safety
•	 External Safety
•	 Environment (including Emissions/Waste/Water)
•	 Fire, Emergency, Rescue or Disaster authority/teams
Some countries have inspectors with combined tasks (some or all of the above functions and 
tasks in one person).
At local level, the assessment manager (lead local or regional authority) communicates to the 
public, internal authorities and with the enterprises. This manager also may coordinate joint 
inspections and other related tasks, including:
•	 Identification and examination of enterprises and activities
•	 Preparation (local or regional) of the inspection plan
•	 Assignment and assessment by dedicated teams of specialists
•	 Joint conclusion and summary report
Only in Denmark are the police involved in preparation of external emergency plans for 
upper-tier establishments and providing information to the public.
5. How is the Seveso II Directive implemented?
Implementing European Directives in national legislation can be accomplished in several 
ways. Member States are free to choose the way they wish to implement them. Their choice 
often depends to a significant extent on the existing legislation surrounding the topic and 
the historical distribution of responsibilities between different competent authorities at both 
national and local level. For this question, respondents indicated that the Seveso Directive had 
been transposed into national legislation in the following ways:
•	 As part of broader (environmental) permitting legislation  6x
•	 As stand-alone legislation     19x
•	 Other        3x 
The Netherlands and Belgium indicated that all three answers are applicable, for example:3 
•	 Belgium: Some topics were implemented in environmental legislation (e.g. Quantitative 
Risk Assessment (QRA) in a separate safety report, apart from the safety report 
resulting from Seveso II). 
3  It is possible that other surveyed countries may have used more than one legislative mechanism to transpose certain 
aspects of Seveso. However, we assume that the majority of responses reflected the predominant mode used to trans-
pose requirements at national level.
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•	 Belgium: Particular aspects of emergency planning are implemented in general law 
and taxation (e.g. “the polluter pays” principle)
•	 Netherlands: Local planning procedures and applications
6. What is the knowledge and experience of participants?
According to the responses, Seveso-related knowledge and the actual tasks of the 
participants generally belonged to one or more of the following categories:
•	 (Field) Inspection and Enforcement (19)4
•	 Direct, lead, coordinate, draft, implement, transpose (12)
•	 Training, guidance, support to local inspectorates, advising (6)
•	 Evaluation of risks/effects/domino effects/accident investigation (5)
•	 Preparation of permits (4) 
The experience with Seveso within the group varied from “wish to learn” (new Member States) 
to profound knowledge and very experienced participants.
3.2 Results from discussion on target groups
This section sets forth the specific characteristics for the target groups studied. Each working 
group produced an individual report containing the detailed outcomes of their discussions. The 
three main discussion approaches (target group, specific rule, intervention strategy) were used 
to order these results and draw conclusions. The results on the usability of the Table of Eleven 
are attached as Annex 6. The details of all the discussions can be found in Annexes 7-11, where 
all working group reports are also included.
3.2.1 Mineral oil refineries
The target group of mineral refineries is a fairly clearly specified group of companies. The 
working group chose not to look at the related petrochemical industry and storage of crude 
materials. Most, maybe even all, refineries are upper-tier Seveso companies and there are 
approximately 5-6 sites in each Member State.
General compliance
The image with respect to compliance on the part of this target group was described as “very 
green”, meaning that, in general, refineries do comply with the Seveso II rules. They tend to do 
so spontaneously. Little governmental enforcement activity is therefore needed to make them 
comply with the rules. 
4 The figures in parentheses specify the number of responses in this category.
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Reputation
Public perception and reputation are very important issues for the refinery target group. 
Refineries are large establishments and cannot “hide” from the authorities and the public. In 
some cases, the refineries are very active in cooperating with the government and communicating 
with the public. They want to have the image of being the best. In the case of non-conformities, 
the reputation-related effects of sanctions are greater than the financial ones.
Member State differences
The international organization of most refineries ensures that there are no big differences 
between the way refineries operate within the Member States. In addition, the way refineries 
are approached by the different authorities is quite similar in the different Member States. 
Moreover, in the Eastern European countries, there tends to be a high respect for governmental 
regulations. In Western European countries, refineries are active in influencing the national 
implementation and interpretation of the regulations.
Knowledge
The refinery industry can afford to retain high-quality staff with a marked proficiency in keeping 
the regulator at a distance and interpreting the rules in line with business objectives. Existing 
management systems, company standards and internal auditing have a strong influence on 
compliance because they already more or less incorporate most Seveso rules anyway. 
The refinery industry’s respect for the authorities can be earned by a demonstration of 
competence and knowledge on the part of the inspector. It is therefore very important that the 
authority assigns experienced inspectors to this target group in order to maximize cooperation 
and the detection of non-conformities (In particular, the inspector must be able to resist being 
intimidated by the experts on the refinery staff and focus on looking for non-conformities.). 
The technical details of the refinery are very complex and often resemble the proverbial “black 
box”. In addition, the knowledge and strengths of technical and legal staff at the refinery can 
also be quite formidable. Hence, inspectors need equally strong enforcement power (and 
knowledge about how to use it) in order to be effective in confronting the operator with 
non-conformities. On the other hand, the refinery’s Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) 
manager may sometimes ask the inspector to issue a non-compliance notice in order to 
convince his superiors to allocate money for improvement measures.
3.2.2 Pharmaceutical industry
Unlike refineries, operations in the pharmaceutical industry vary considerably in terms of size. 
Pharmaceutical sites can be small, medium or large, consisting of both upper and lower-tier 
sites. In order to provide good focus for the discussions, the pharmaceutical industry working 
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group chose to discuss medium-size, international and upper-tier companies. It was also noted 
that some Member States have a very small pharmaceutical industry (only one operation or 
company) and others have no pharmaceutical industry at all.
General compliance
In general, the pharmaceutical industry tends to comply rather easily with Seveso requirements. 
Production is generally conducted in accordance with Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP). 
GMP is a worldwide standard for the control and management of manufacturing and the 
quality-control testing of pharmaceutical products. Quality and good hygiene are critical 
production concerns and practices supporting these core production values are well aligned 
with good health and safety practices. 
Reputation
The pharmaceutical industry guards its reputation as a “good actor” vigilantly. The industry 
wants the public to buy its products and to be a good “citizen” and employer. This attitude 
provides strong motivation to ensure good compliance with Seveso rules. The industry is aware 
of the risks associated with producing very active substances and the health problems these 
can potentially cause when released in large quantities. In most cases concern for reputation 
stimulates spontaneous compliance with the rules. In addition, if a company recognizes that 
implementation of a specific rule benefits other objectives of the organization (e.g. Good 
Manufacturing Practice), the rule will be more easily implemented. Despite its high motivation, 
the industry can run into difficulties with “unclear” rules, that is, when it is not clear how 
the rule applies specifically to pharmaceutical operations. Enforcement activities are therefore 
more relevant and needed for unclear rules than for others.
Other aspects
The unloading and storage of solvents is the usual reason that the scope of Seveso regulations 
becomes applicable in the pharmaceutical industry. The quantity of manufactured substances 
may also “activate” Seveso regulations but companies often find ways of keeping the quantities 
of these substances under the Seveso thresholds. This target group was also notable for Seveso 
implementation challenges associated with identifying and classifying hazards associated with 
intermediate products and “exotic” (i.e. not widely used) substances. Identifying the dangerous 
characteristics that should be notified according to the notification rule and addressed in the 
safety report can be a complex task. (Often, the “summation rule” in Annex 1, Part 2 of the 
Directive must be applied, which can involve the painstaking addition of several small quantities 
of substances.)
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3.2.3 Fertilizers production
The fertilizer industry is a target group with a long history and rather conventional production 
techniques. Changes in production methods tend to evolve over long periods of time. Products 
of this industry can vary from harmless to very dangerous, and as the accident of 21 September 
2001 in Toulouse, France, demonstrated, on-site risk management plans should recognize 
and address the potential presence of quantities of rejected or non-conforming (“off-spec”) 
products. In addition, the presence of ammonium nitrate in large quantities on some of these 
sites poses a potential security concern. The working group centred its discussions on a site 
with international production and storage operations that uses ammonia and methanol and also 
produces urea, a common profile for Seveso sites in this sector. 
General compliance
Discussions for this target group focused solely on “soft” rules5 mainly taken from the safety 
management system requirement. It was concluded that compliance with soft rules is not 
particularly spontaneous in this target group. In general, violations of soft rules may be hard to 
identify and prove. Moreover, in this target group compliance with technical rules is perceived 
as more important than compliance with safety management system rules.
Reputation
Reputation is not the highest priority issue for this sector. The perceived added value of the 
rule, in addition to the risk of detection and sanctioning by the authorities if violated, are 
factors that have a strong influence on operator compliance with soft rules. Experience with 
this sector indicates that, generally, operators do not value legal compliance with soft rules 
very highly.
3.2.4 Batch processing 
The batch-processing sector consists of a wide variety of companies. Establishments vary widely 
in terms of the types and number of products they produce, the substances they handle, process 
complexity, organizational structure and scale of operation. The processes can vary from simple 
to highly complex. The dynamics of change are particularly relevant for this group, especially 
the effect of changes in site ownership. Smaller companies tend to be mostly independent, 
larger companies are often part of an international organization. The larger international 
corporations were chosen as the specific target group for the working group discussions on 
5 In this document the terms “hard” and “soft” rules refer to obligations in terms of the ease with which performance 
of the obligation can be observed and measured. Compliance with hard rules can generally be measured objectively, for 
example, through quantitative methods or comparison with clear and widely accepted standards. In contrast soft rules 
are defined by the absence of an objective standard to which performance can be compared. Sometimes the qualitative 
nature of a rule makes compliance particularly hard to define but performance measures and specialized verification 
methods can sometimes be developed to overcome this problem.
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this MJV. Unfortunately, the working group did not include an industrial representative who 
could have provided an additional perspective from the side of the operators.
General compliance
In general, the working group agreed that this sector has a positive compliance attitude, which 
means that the majority of companies spontaneously comply with the rules. The level of compliance 
can vary somewhat according to the operator’s acceptance of the particular objective of a rule, 
the effort it requires to implement it, and the economic factors and knowledge involved.
3.2.5 LPG storage
LPG storage companies engage in very different types of activities, including the storage and 
filling of aerosol applications. LPG storage itself is a rather simple process. Some competent 
Seveso authorities also inspect smaller LPG sites, even below lower-tier thresholds. For 
example, Ireland and Finland inspect sites that store amounts of liquefied petroleum gasses in 
excess of 5 tons.
The LPG sector, and specifically the larger companies and multinationals, is very familiar 
with safety regulations, as safety standards in this sector were established decades ago. 
Consequently, rules established by this sector itself are often more readily accepted than rules 
set by the authorities. Nonetheless, compliance levels for technical rules appear to be fairly 
high. Very small companies may be less knowledgeable about safety but may adopt rules set by 
the authorities with less resistance than the large organizations.
For purposes of discussion, the target group was defined as consisting of locally or regionally 
operating companies, with a particular focus on (un)loading operations. The filling of cylinders 
and a number of other special activities were by and large excluded from the discussion. 
General compliance
The LPG sector is not a proactive sector, but slow and resistant to change. The clarity of 
rules and economic considerations influence the degree to which specific requirements are 
implemented. Many operators seem to aim at achieving no more than the minimum requested 
by the authorities, and usually it requires considerable effort to effect a change. On the other 
hand, multinationals are often more proactive, because they establish and adhere to their own 
worldwide standards. 
Reputation
Image is not a very important driver for the LPG sector. Reputation in relation to safety is 
perceived in different ways. In particular, safety at the site is not particularly affected by public 
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opinion. However, when LPG is used as an energy source in the domestic sphere and an accident 
occurs, the public can be very sceptical about the LPG sector. 
Knowledge
The level of safety-related knowledge in this sector is higher among multinational companies 
than at smaller, local or regional operations. The latter companies are often forced to outsource 
expertise to consultants due to limited in-house capacity. Compliance levels have improved 
considerably since the early days of Seveso II implementation. Today, operators as well as 
authorities have much more experience and knowledge of the requirements and how to fulfil 
them. In addition, companies have a better understanding of the enforcement structure and 
what to expect, which (positively or negatively) influences compliance levels.
3.3 Results from discussion on specific rules
The five specific Seveso rules mentioned in section 3.3.2 were discussed in the different working 
groups with the help of the eleven factors in the Table of Eleven. The actual rules and cases that 
were discussed are listed in the following table.
Working group Rules discussed
1. Mineral oil refinery 1 2 5
2. Pharmaceutical industry 5 1 2
3. Fertilizers production 4 5
4. Batch processing 3 4
5. LPG storage 2 3 X Y
The LPG storage working group discussed a number of additional rules:
X = Safety management system, operational control element (Seveso Art. 7, 9 and Annex III 
sub c.iii).
Y = ATEX6 at LPG storage, including cylinder filling.
3.3.1 Submitting a notification (rule 1)
General
The rule of submitting a notification was discussed for two target groups in working groups 1 and 
2. Both target groups have motivation to spontaneously comply with this administrative rule.
6 Directive 94/9/EEC Equipment and Protective systems intended for use in Potentially Explosive Atmospheres (ATEX)
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Strengths
•	 Submitting a notification is a low-cost action and is therefore easily accepted by 
operators within the sectors who are aware that they handle dangerous substances and 
are conscious of their responsibility. Also, this rule has a high risk of detection, which 
stimulates compliance even more. Most of these companies are accustomed to complying 
with similar rules and do not object to submitting the notification. Non or partial 
compliance can occur when a company views the rule as an annoying administrative 
burden, unnecessarily duplicating work that has already been done, i.e., the government 
has already received the information in some shape or form on the basis of other 
regulatory requirements. 
•	 Some sites, which already dealt with Seveso I requirements, are not fully aware of this 
new requirement in Seveso II, and may sometimes fail to notify or properly notify the 
authorities for this reason. New Member States do not have this problem. 
•	 Compliance and non-compliance with this rule is relatively easy to assess as long as 
sites that fall within the scope of the Seveso II Directive are easily identifiable by the 
authorities. 
•	 The notification helps some companies to become more aware of the amounts of 
dangerous substances that may actually be present at the site. This newfound awareness 
can sometimes lead to actions by the operator to reduce these amounts, for instance, 
a shutdown of certain parts of the establishment or a reduction in storage capacity and 
elimination or phasing-out of the most dangerous goods from their operations. It is not 
unusual in this situation for a site to drop from upper-tier to lower-tier status due to 
adjustments to its inventory of substances and improved inventory management. 
Weaknesses
•	 There are some important differences in the way this rule has been transposed into 
national laws. Reportable amounts may differ between Member States. In addition, some 
countries use a variety of mechanisms as the basis for measuring reportable quantities, 
including maximum capacity amounts listed in the environmental permit and average 
amounts of dangerous substances on-site in a certain time period (usually a year). The 
amount of intermediate product during reactions is also often hard to determine.
•	 For some industries, such as the pharmaceutical industry, classification, particularly of 
intermediates and mixtures, may be rather more challenging than for other industries. 
The challenging issues include the complex logistics associated with many substances in 
small quantities for which classification of dangerous properties is imprecise or uncertain. 
The waste management industry is another sector that shares this challenge. 
•	 Changes in classification of dangerous substances or threshold values can cause more 
sites to fall under the Seveso scope, but if these changes are not communicated well 
enough, sites are unaware of their new obligations. This is mostly the case for smaller 
sites that do not have the staff to keep track of regulatory changes.
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•	 It may be possible for companies, particularly for those with smaller sites, which are 
seeking to hide from this rule to do so. To detect them, the authorities would have to 
discover, firstly, that they exist and, secondly, have reason to suspect that dangerous 
substances were being handled in amounts close to threshold quantities. In addition, 
non-Seveso inspectors that may visit these companies are not familiar enough with 
Seveso requirements to judge whether or not the Seveso Directive applies.
•	 The role of the public in reporting violations of this rule is very limited due to the limited 
public access to information as to whether companies did or did not provide notification 
themselves.
3.3.2 Major accident scenarios (rule 2)
General
Working groups 1, 2 and 5 discussed the rule relating to the inclusion of major accident scenarios 
in the safety report. Generally, companies understand the added value of scenario development 
but face challenges in compliance because they do not necessarily understand how to apply the 
rule to their own operations (lack of clarity). Furthermore, smaller companies generally lack 
the knowledge and expertise. Spontaneous compliance is therefore not as high as it could be 
and active enforcement is necessary to achieve higher compliance levels.
Strengths
•	 Once the scenario requirement is clearly explained (e.g., by an inspector), it is often 
less difficult to enforce because the companies see that it makes practical sense. It may 
contribute to greater awareness of the risks. Scenarios also have a more general usefulness, 
since they can sometimes be used for emergency training and internal auditing.
•	 In most Member States, there are national guidelines and manuals that elaborate this 
requirement.
•	 Scenario development is an important building block of the Seveso requirements, so the 
authorities will always scrutinize it. 
Weaknesses
•	 Considerable technical knowledge is needed to draw up appropriate and useful scenarios. 
Normally, only the big international companies have adequate resources for this task. 
Smaller companies must generally rely on external experts for this work, who are often 
expensive.
•	 The drafting of major accident scenarios is a time-consuming and thus costly requirement. 
Moreover, a lack of good guidance in this area raises concerns about errors in the analysis, 
e.g., overlooked or “missing” scenarios. There is an ongoing debate concerning which and 
how many scenarios can be considered as appropriate and proportionate to the risk.
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•	 Because guidance and criteria for implementing this rule are unclear, it is also hard to 
convince company superiors that an actual violation has occurred. Imposing a sanction on 
the basis of a violation of this rule is therefore rather difficult.
•	 Differences among the Member States in terms of implementation approach (i.e. 
transposition into national legislation) and actual enforcement of this rule vary widely. 
For example:
o	 Enforcement actions routinely applied can be as simple as a letter (requesting 
improved performance) in some Member States, or as harsh as prosecution in other 
Member States on the basis of an “incomplete” safety report (because the scenarios 
are judged inadequate or missing).
o	 In some Member States, inspectors may request the written scenarios from the 
records and review them on paper and in practice. This may lead to interesting 
results because the actual situation can be very different from what is written 
down in the scenario. In other Member States, the inspection only determines that 
the record of the scenario exists and there is no further possibility to review the 
scenario itself.
•	 Verification that scenarios have been selected and assessed properly requires a particular 
expertise. Not all inspectors may have the rather high level of technical knowledge and 
experience required to properly evaluate compliance in this regard, or at least do so with 
respect to certain sectors.
•	 Social control on this rule is often impossible because of national security considerations 
that prevent the public from having access to the pertinent information. However, in 
some Member States scenario-related information is available to the public.
3.2.3 Consequence assessment (rule 3)
General
The rule for consequence assessment was discussed in working groups 4 and 5. Another 
working group concluded that this rule has a lot of similarities with the rule concerning major 
accident scenarios and therefore chose not to discuss this rule separately.
Strengths
• A wide variety of calculation models and programs for consequence assessment are 
available in the marketplace. 
• Consequence distances and risk contours are understood to be important because 
they have a direct influence on the reputation and expansion possibilities of some sites, 
particular in relation to potential for future land-use planning. 
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Weaknesses
• The different calculation models/programs are also a weakness. Particularly, finding the 
right tool to analyze a particular site can be difficult, since they are all very different from 
each other and produce different results. Analyzing and having confidence that the results 
are more or less in the correct range can also be difficult for this reason. Some Member 
States prescribe the use of one or two specific models in order to avoid confusion and 
allow comparison of the results of different sites.
• In calculating consequences, it is often possible to make slight adjustments to the inputs to 
produce an acceptable outcome, regardless of the reality of the situation.
• As is the case with the major accident scenarios rule, inspectors require special expertise 
to determine if the assessments have been prepared in the right way.
3.3.4 Identification of training needs (rule 4)
General
Working groups 3 and 4 discussed this rule. The compliance in both target groups is very 
different. The fertilizer industry will not spontaneously comply, whereas the batch industry has 
a spontaneous compliance level of approximately 80%. This is mainly caused by the “softness” 
of this rule and the specific aspect it deals with. Training is often provided, but the identification 
of non-standard training needs or a specific retraining programme for specific skills are not 
areas covered very well, if at all.
Strengths
•	 This rule is seen as a clear and logical thing to do when mentioned, but practical 
implementation is a challenge. 
•	 Identification of training needs is also part of quality and other management systems. 
Non-official checks by auditors of quality or environmental management systems can 
promote spontaneous compliance.
Weaknesses
•	 Identification of training needs is a rather “soft” safety management system rule. It is 
unclear what criteria are used to determine if the company has done enough to comply. 
•	 Detecting violation of this rule is a challenge. Factors that play an important role in 
this regard are the expertise of the inspector and the thoroughness with which the 
management system is inspected. Cases in which a training programme is complete 
but the formal identification of training needs is not covered are often not reported as 
instances of non-compliance.
•	 Additional training as a consequence of the identification of training needs is time-consuming 
and expensive, and the added value is difficult to determine (for example, how many 
accidents are prevented by rightly identifying training needs?).
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•	 Sanctions for violations of this rule are rather limited because the added value is hard to 
prove. However, in cases of accidents due to a lack of training, sanctions can be more 
severe.
3.3.5 Procedures for management of change (rule 5)
General
The Seveso rule to have procedures for management of change was discussed in working 
groups 1 and 2. Generally, most companies spontaneously comply with this rule because of the 
general advantage for production, quality, environmental and safety purposes of having a good 
management of change process. Details of implementation are, however, challenging, because it 
is another soft rule, where a lot of differences in interpretation are possible. The details of the 
procedures are often part of the discussions between companies and authorities.
Strengths
•	 Management of change (MOC) is broadly accepted as a good and effective process and 
also forms part of other management systems.
•	 The actual presence of MOC procedures is not the problem, the quality and coverage of 
the procedures can be.
•	 Most MOC procedures cover at least projects, rebuilds and technical changes.
Weaknesses
•	 The Seveso Directive does not give any specific definition of a change. The individual 
Member States each have their own interpretation as to what should be covered by the 
procedure.
•	 Discussions on definition vary in terms of focus from the size and sort of changes that 
should be covered (organizational, technical, procedural) to the administrative records 
that should be kept.
•	 Finding gaps in the MOC procedure requires knowledge and experience on the part 
of inspectors and a good inspection technique. Several inspection techniques for this 
purpose are available in Member States.
3.3.6 Procedures for operational control (rule X)
The rule to have procedures and instructions for operational control, one of the elements 
of the safety management system, was discussed by the LPG working group. In summary, the 
results of the group’s discussion were as follows:
•	 Instructions as required by this rule are often oral instead of written. The smaller 
companies with a limited number of personnel do not always need to put, or see the 
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advantage of putting, everything they do on paper. Copies of procedures or instructions 
from multinationals can be found. Sometimes, a quality or environmental ISO system 
helps in terms of obtaining written instructions.
•	 During first inspections, a check is carried out to determine the existence of instructions. 
Later inspections focus on the contents, which require specific skills on the part of the 
inspector. Instructions copied from other companies often do not represent the reality 
(not tailored to the situation in question). Physical inspection is therefore needed in 
addition to an administrative check.
•	 Especially at smaller companies with very little personnel, written instructions are 
seen as an administrative burden and staff of these companies tends to feel that oral 
instructions are enough. It is hard for the inspector to find the right balance between oral 
and written instructions and determine what does and does not constitute compliance 
with this rule.
•	 Compliance with this rule does not lead to a higher level of safety and enforcing it is 
overly punitive as a first measure. Only increasing the severity of the sanction can lead 
to compliance with the rule. The industry is aware that it is not severely sanctioned for 
initial non-compliance with the requirement of instructions.
3.3.7 ATEX regulation regarding LPG (rule Y)
ATEX regulation is more technical and reality-driven than Seveso. ATEX focuses on 
high-probability risks. The level of acceptance for this sort of rule is higher because it is related 
to daily operations. The high costs and limited time for implementation of ATEX requirements 
is, however, a major disadvantage. 
In general, violations of ATEX are easier to detect than Seveso violations.
3.4 Intervention strategies
3.4.1 Classical intervention
In most Member States, classic intervention methods like prosecution and imposing penalties 
are very effective. In Eastern European countries, the culture of respect for official authority is 
still very strong. The idea and risk of being prosecuted is enough to induce compliance on the 
part of companies.
Western European Member States often use official or even unofficial warning letters, especially 
with regard to “soft” requirements like management system procedures, as a first enforcement 
step. In addition, agreements are made between competent authorities and companies to ensure 
that specific actions are taken within a certain time frame to achieve a state of compliance. In 
most cases, no further action is needed. This is an important way of filtering out the ”good 
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actors”, that is, the companies that simply need guidance on how to comply and do so if they 
are informed of what is expected of them.
3.4.2 Interventions for spontaneous compliance
Spontaneous compliance is, according to the Table of Eleven, dependent on five factors. Possible 
interventions (for all or some rules) were discussed in the working groups for each factor. The 
intervention actions and possibilities that resulted are:
Knowledge of the rules
•	 Improving subjective “soft” rules to make them as clear as possible.
•	 Improving the enforceability of rules by involving inspectors in their formulation.
•	 Authorities should make clear what their requirements and expectations are, and 
forward this information to the sector organizations and the main consultants involved in 
the implementation of the regulation.
•	 Elaborating qualitative rules in EU documentation.
•	 Making use of trade organizations to distribute information, promote the importance of 
the rules and disseminate ways to comply.
•	 Communication with industry about changes in regulation is important.
•	 The dissemination of existing instruments, books, websites and other sources of 
information represents an opportunity to reduce the differences in knowledge and 
experience between Member States and companies.
•	 Promoting joint problem-solving with a view to creating sector-specific solutions.
•	 Supporting public training courses for companies and experts.
•	 Publishing FAQs on a central website.
•	 Electronic newsletter for all Seveso companies and professionals (consultants and 
inspectors).
Advantages/disadvantages of (non-)compliance
•	 Having a special help desk for companies to determine if Seveso applies to them. 
•	 Making notification easy by having a standard (electronic) form, with clear instructions. 
•	 Making it easy to find out the Seveso classification for all substances. Advertise the 
existing website http://ecb.jrc.it/classification-labelling/search-classlab/.
•	 Providing good guidance in the form, for example, of models, cases that have worked in 
practice, methodologies, and information on what the major accident scenarios should 
contain. Exchange these elements of guidance through specialist or trade journals.
•	 Directing industrial representatives to specialized consultants who know about the 
specific area the representatives are working in.
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Degree of acceptance of the rule
•	 Making use of trade unions and industrial associations.
•	 Involving the industrial sector in creating and evaluating rules.
•	 Promoting discussion on the benefits and social value of Seveso II compliance.
•	 Making industry aware of specific problems by initiating a survey on accidents with certain 
causes (behaviour, training or maintenance, for example) or the issue of a periodical 
accident analysis report.
Faithfulness of the target group
•	 Joint problem-solving between industry and authorities. The success and possibility of 
this strategy depends strongly on cultural factors and the availability of resources.
•	 Stimulating safety culture initiatives by the government.
Non-official control
•	 Investigating the possible role of NGOs like insurance companies and certifying or notified 
bodies. A covenant or agreement for the reporting of non-conformities is sometimes 
possible.
3.4.3 Interventions with respect to enforcement factors
Risk of being reported
•	 Setting up confidential reporting systems for employees (clicking lines), taking into account 
the cultural problems related to this kind of intervention.
•	 Advertising campaign targeting employees and focusing on a safe workers’ environment 
and the possibility to inform the competent authority.
•	 Promoting the establishment of safety committees within companies.
•	 Educating safety representatives of safety committees.
Risk of inspection
•	 Improving training and guidance for inspectors.
•	 Changing the mindset of inspectors: raising the profile of the training of personnel in the 
area of major hazards.
•	 Splitting up inspection plans into technical and management system inspections.
•	 Advertising and raising awareness about the likelihood of inspection (through trade 
organizations).
•	 Making use of both document inspection and physical inspection of subjects. For instance, the 
carrying out of physical inspections and checking the outcomes of these against written scenarios 
is done with success (resulting in surprising non-compliances) in some Member States.
•	 Publicizing the inspection methods the competent authorities use.
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Risk of detection of non-compliance 
•	 Dissemination of good inspection practices and the sharing of information.
•	 Thorough training and guidance for inspectors.
•	 Improving the quality of inspections by making inspectors aware of the process and hazard 
risks within the specific industry they are inspecting.
•	 Making sure that, in addition to having a profound technical knowledge, the inspectors are 
trained and able to perform audits and inspections of management systems.
•	 Intensification of the quality and depth of inspections on instructions and procedures.
•	 Increasing awareness and encouraging feedback from non-Seveso inspectors (“eyes and 
ears”) to find new Seveso companies or detect those ducking Seveso regulations.
Selectivity of inspections
•	 Having and communicating a clear targeting policy.
•	 Promoting good examples of individual companies within the sector.
•	 Ireland has some experience with Volunteer Protection Programme (VPP) systems.7 VPP 
is a self-auditing system for all kinds of management systems such as H, S or E. If the 
company achieves 4 or 5 stars, it receives a flag it hangs outside its premises. Tested with 
10 American-based companies. This programme has some similarities with the Danish 
“smiley system”, in which the level of enforcement for a company that has passed an 
inspection favourably will be reduced, though enforcement will never become absent as 
such.
Risk of sanction
•	 Improving enforceability of rules: make it easier to prove qualitative factors in court.
•	 Publicizing results of inspections and enforcement letters.
•	 Administrative fining system for “soft” requirements.
Severity of sanction
•	 Clear sanctioning policy affecting reputation.
•	 Active publication of enforcement letters, inspection reports and accident investigation 
reports.
•	 Informing the neighbourhood through negative publication.
7 See www.vpppa.org for more information.
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4. Conclusions and Recommendations
The MJV led to of the following general conclusions and recommendations about Member State 
approaches to enforcement: 
	 Except for implementation of some rules and the direct or indirect use 
of classical interventions, limited differences are found between Member 
States. These differences seem to depend, on the one hand, on the “age” of the 
Member State as part of the European Union and, on the other, on cultural differences. 
Enforcement in “new” Member States appears to be based mainly on respect on the 
part of enterprises towards the authorities. The authority involved plays a relatively 
leading role with regard to the rules and means to be applied as well as the goals to be 
achieved. In “experienced” Members States, by contrast, the authority involved tends 
to focus on enforcement with regard to (management) processes and (common) goals 
rather than on the means and methods to be used. All Member States, however, deal 
with multiple interpretations of rules, the carrying out of joint inspections, the design 
of inspection methods and the required level of training and knowledge on the part of 
inspectors.
	 All Member States deal with multiple interpretations of rules, perform joint 
inspections and cope with the associated challenges of coordination and the 
(continuous) updating and improving of inspection methods. Most Member 
States recognize the necessity of training for inspectors, the need to possess and 
enhance knowledge of particular enterprises or industrial processes, and the desire to 
exchange information and “best practices” in order to learn from equivalent European 
authorities.
	 Self-compliance, image and reputation are a major driver for many 
companies, but this aspect is not yet integrated in authorities’ enforcement 
strategies. Comparing the different target groups studied, reputation and public 
image is an important issue for large, multinational industries with products used 
by the public. Enterprises having a good Environment, Health and Safety (EHS) 
staff with a lot of knowledge will also have a better level of compliance. This factor 
makes a significant contribution to spontaneous compliance and a reduction in the 
enforcement effort required. On an operational level, the use of sanctions on the 
“reputation and image” of enterprises is a possibility to stimulate compliance.   
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	 A challenge lies in improving the clarity and enforceability of rules, for 
example “hard” versus “soft” rules. Companies having a good EHS staff with a 
lot of knowledge will also manifest better compliance levels. Smaller companies tend to 
have more problems with new, unclear rules and are more dependent on information 
from the authorities. “Soft” rules, i.e., where performance is usually measured in 
qualitative terms, for example “the identification of training needs” often have to 
be elaborated. There is no general, uniform elaboration of soft rules.   
	 The level of knowledge and training of inspectors influences the 
probability of inspection and the probability of violations being 
detected during inspections. A profile of industrial expertise and adequate 
competence is required for inspectors to be recognized as counterparts for 
industry. In particular it is recommended to have multinational enterprises 
inspected and their compliance enforced by experienced inspectors.  
	 Information exchange between inspectors both at national and European level is a 
mechanism for keeping inspectors and inspection programmes informed about good 
inspection and safety practices. Modern communication tools can be exploited to 
overcome the challenge of effecting an exchange of experiences and good practices 
between Member States. Moreover, MJVs have a important added value in terms of 
their ability to provide an inventory of common problems relating to Seveso regulations 
and as a forum for discussing potential solutions. The exchange of information between 
Member States can be stimulated in a number of ways, for example, by development of 
appropriate websites, elaboration of a high quality Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) 
document, the provision of guidance on good practices of other Member States and 
actively informing all parties involved. 
	 On a European level, it was recommended that the enforceability of 
legislation should be a subject which legislators take into account. Within this 
recommendation the following key points were also underlined:
–	 Experienced inspectors and industrial representatives can be of great value in the 
legislative process due to their specialised knowledge and experience and kept 
informed, they can also help to secure greater public support. 
–	 A lack of consistency of Member State enforcement standards and practices 
continues also to undermine enforceability. Inconsistencies could be mitigated 
through agreement on or development of common technical references, for 
example:
o	 Guidance documents pertaining to the “soft”, that is qualitative, parts of 
the applicable legislation could aid in reducing differences. 
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o	 Promoting ISO certification of safety management systems could also 
reduce inconsistencies in the interpretation of this particular requirement. 
o	 Standard inspection methods at international level could be established 
and adapted for national and local use.
	 Effective enforcement is often hampered by national level challenges, such 
as resource limitations and lack of clear criteria for enforcing soft rules. 
Enforceability of legislation is critical in terms of preventing enforcement problems at 
the source. Implementation of European Union Directives is sometimes fragmented and 
“cluttered” with other rules because of existing legislation on the subject. Moreover, 
maintaining an inspections programme empowered with an adequate budget and 
competent staff to enforce the Directive is essential. In line with these concepts, the 
MJV made the following specific suggestions:
o	 National authorities should make as much use of European Union guidelines as 
possible when implementing, explaining and interpreting the new rules.
o	 Certification – after examination – of inspectors is an option. Some of the 
inspectorates are already certified according to ISO 9000. Certification (of 
inspectors or companies) might help in raising the importance of training and 
qualified inspectors. Some countries (e.g. England) already have certification systems 
and certificates for inspectors; a new certificate (“within other certificates”) may 
create chaos.
o	 The quality of inspection services may also be improved by setting national minimum 
requirements for inspectors with regard to knowledge and experience.
o	 The inspectorates should have adequate capacity, methods and knowledge to 
perform effective physical inspections.
Understanding the typical compliance profiles of different industrial sectors may 
also assist inspectorates in developing more effective enforcement strategies, for 
example: 
o	 Public perception and company concerns about reputation should be factored into 
enforcement strategies and sanctioning.
o	 Multinational companies should be inspected by experienced inspectors. It is 
important for all inspections that the inspectors carrying them out have a thorough 
understanding of what it is they are inspecting.
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ANNEX 1  The Netherlands MJV 2006 Programme
Tuesday 7 November 2006
Afternoon / Evening Arrival of participants at hotel
Wednesday 8 November 2006
09.00 – 09.30 Registration, coffee and tea
09.30 – 09.45  Welcome (host Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment – DG Ms J. 
Hilgersom)
09.45 – 10.15  Introduction and goal of MJV 2006 “Enforcement of Seveso II” (Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Employment – Mr J. Oh)
10.15 – 11.00 Feedback regarding results of questionnaire (DHV – Mr J. van Middelaar)
11.00 – 11.30 Break
11.30 – 12.15  Program and methodology regarding the Table of Eleven (Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Employment – Ms E. van der Stegen)
12.15 – 14.00 Lunch
14.00 – 17.30 Working group sessions (part 1)
19.30  Dinner   
Thursday 9 November 2006
08.30 – 09.00 Arrival at the Ministry, coffee and tea
09.00 – 10.00  Feedback regarding results of working group sessions part 1 (plenary, 
presentations by 5 working groups)
10.00 – 12.30 Working group sessions (part 2)
12.30 – 14.00 Lunch
14.00 – 17.30  Working group sessions (part 3, including preparation of final 
presentations)
19.30  Dinner
Friday 10 November 2006
08.30 – 09.00 Arrival at the Ministry, coffee and tea
09.00 – 10.30 Working group presentations (15 minutes per working group)
10.30 – 11.00 Coffee break
11.30 – 12.30 Conclusions, recommendations, and looking forward 
12.30 – 14.00 Lunch (buffet)
12.30  Travel to trains / airport
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ANNEX 2 List of participants
First Name Surname Company Country E-mail
Mr Lee Allford EPSC United Kingdom Lallford-epsc@icheme.org
Mr Alvaro Barroqueiro National Inspectorate for the Environment Portugal abarroqueiro@igaot.pt
Mr Bent Bolstad Norwegian Pollution Control Authority Norway bent.bolstad@sft.no 
Ms Inger Bye Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority Norway Inger.Bye@dsb.no
Mr Robin Cowley Health and Safety Executive United Kingdom Robin.Cowley@hse.gsi.gov.uk
Mr Danny De Baere Federal Public Service Employment, Labour and 
Social Dialogue
Belgium danny.debaere@meta.fgov.be
Ms Simone Dekker-
Steehouwer
Labour Inspectorate, Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Employment
Netherlands SDekker@MINSZW.NL
Mr Daniel Geisbacher Slovak Inspectorate of the Environment Slovak Republic geisbacher@sizp.sk
Ms Maria Eugenia Gil  Regional Community of Catalonia Spain megil@gencat.net
Ms Zsuzsanna Gyenes National Directorate General for Disaster 
Management
Hungary zsuzsanna.gyenes@katved.hu
Mr Klaus Hougaard Fyns Amt Denmark KLH@fyns-amt.dk
Ms Valburga Kanazir Ministry of Environmental Protection, Physical 
Planning and Construction
Croatia miljenka.klicek@mzopu.hr
Mr Hans Kirudd Swedish Work Environment Authority Sweden hans.kirudd@av.se
Ms Miljenka Klicek Ministry of Environmental Protection, Physical 
Planning and Construction
Croatia miljenka.klicek@mzopu.hr
Mr Themistoclis Kyriacou Department of Labour Cyprus tkyriacou@dli.mlsi.gov.cy
Ms Anne-Mari Lahde Tukes, Safety Technology Authority Finland anne-mari.lahde@tukes.fi
Mr Giorgio Mari ISPESL (Italian Institute for Health and Safety at 
Work)
Italy giorgio.mari@ispesl.it
Ms Andrea Menne AstraZeneca AB Sweden Andrea.X.Menne2@astrazeneca.com
Ms Cristina Miclaus National Environmental Guard - Romania Romania cristinamiclaus1959@yahoo.com
Ms Carmen Miclea National Environmental Guard - Romania Romania miclea@mmc.ro
Ms Angela Moriarty Health and Safety Authority Ireland angela_moriarty@hsa.ie
Mr Alfred Moser Government of Linz Austria alfred.moser@mag.linz.at
Mr Joy Oh Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment Netherlands joh@minszw.nl
Mr Marek Podgorski National Headquarters of the State Fire Service Poland mpodgorski@kgpsp.gov.pl
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ANNEX 3 Working groups
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ANNEX 4 Model questionnaire
QUESTIONNAIRE
MJV November 8, 9, 10 2006 in the Netherlands
Name   :
Position  :
Country  : 
1.  Which authority is primarily responsible for the enforcement of Seveso II in 
your country?
Answer: (name of one regulatory authority, e.g. Ministry of Environment)
2.  Who are the other competent authorities with regard to Seveso II 
enforcement?
Answer: (names of other authorities such as local district boards, municipal councils, fire 
brigades, Labour Inspectorates etc)
3.  How are the authorities (with regard to Seveso II enforcement) organized 
and coordinated?
Answer: (brief description of organizational structure)
4.  Please describe the primary responsibility of each authority involved with 
regard to Seveso II enforcement.
Answer: (brief description of responsibility of each authority as specified in your answers 
to questions 1 and 2)
5.  How is Seveso II implemented in legal terms, by (environmental) permitting 
or by direct legislation?
Answer: (please tick as appropriate)
O As part of (environmental) permitting
O Direct legislation
O Other, namely: …………….
6. What is your personal role with regard to Seveso II enforcement?
Answer: (brief description of, for example, your day-to-day work-related activities, job 
description, etc)
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7.  With regard to Seveso II enforcement, do you have specific knowledge (e.g. 
training, certificates) and/or practical experience in one of the following types 
of industry?
Answer: (Please specify in terms of “grade” 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 : 1 = least knowledge or experience; 
5 = most expert knowledge and/or experience. Please note that each grade may be used 
only once.)
..  Mineral oil refinery
.. Pharmaceutical industry
.. Fertilizers production and storage
..  (SME, small-scale) Batch processing and/or multipurpose chemicals mixing and filling
..  LPG storage in pressurized vessels
Please return before 6 October 2006 to: 
E-mail: Sonja@ckc-seminars.nl
Telefax: + 31 (0)40 212 94 07
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ANNEX 5 Description of the Table of Eleven
The Table of Eleven
A versatile tool 
Table of Contents
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 What is the Table of Eleven?
1.2 Why use the Table?
1.3 What is the origin of the Table of Eleven?
1.4 By whom can it be used? 
2. THE DIMENSIONS OF THE TABLE OF ELEVEN
2.1 The spontaneous compliance dimensions 
2.2 The enforcement dimensions 
3. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
3.1 Compliance with legislation: cause and scope
3.2 Coherence between the different dimensions
3.3 The Table of Eleven in practical research and management processes
4. CHECKLIST FOR POLICY, LEGISLATION AND INSTRUMENTATION 
4.1 Spontaneous compliance dimensions 
4.2 Enforcement dimensions
4.3 Golden rules of the Table of Eleven
5. TABLE OF ELEVEN COMPLIANCE PROFILE
6. COMPLIANCE ESTIMATE
Colophon
Should you have any questions or remarks, please contact the Law Enforcement Expertise 
Centre of the Dutch Ministry of Justice.
Version: November 2004 
Ministry of Justice
Law Enforcement Expertise Centre
PO Box 20301
2500 EH The Hague
The Netherlands
Telephone: + 31 (0)70 – 370 6644 
Fax: + 31 (0)70 – 370 7959
Email: ERh@minjus.nl
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PREFACE
In 1994, the Dutch Ministry of Justice studied the possibility of periodically monitoring the level 
of compliance with legislation. It was during that project that the “Table of Eleven” originated. 
The Table of Eleven is a model based on behavioural sciences, consisting of eleven dimensions. 
Together, these dimensions are decisive for the level of compliance with legislation. The eleven 
dimensions are formulated with a view to as high a practicability as possible in the fields of 
policymaking and law enforcement. The dimensions provide criteria with which we can assess 
whether or not it is possible to enforce draft legislation. These criteria, however, can also be 
used to evaluate existing legislation. 
In the following years, the Table of Eleven was refined and improved. In addition, we gained 
the necessary experience in using it. These days, the Table of Eleven is a household name 
among policymakers, jurists drafting legislation, supervisors and enforcers within the Dutch 
government. 
However, this does not mean that the Table of Eleven has reached its final version and cannot 
be further improved. New knowledge on compliance and insight into the application of the 
Table of Eleven also result in the model being adjusted all the time. 
The Law Enforcement Expertise Centre (LEEC) of the Ministry of Justice coordinates the use 
and development of the Table of Eleven within the Dutch government. Since its creation, several 
tools were developed around the model. One of the simplest applications was the so-called 
Checklist for the Legislator, a questionnaire with yes/no answers, quickly giving the legislator 
an impression as to whether it is possible to comply with a new rule for the purpose of the 
obligatory Practicability and Enforceability Test. The Compliance Estimate is a quantitative 
estimate (based on several steps) of the compliance behaviour of target groups. The “Can a 
Rule be Complied With?” test is a frequently used tool by enforcing bodies in order to make 
an estimate of the dominant compliance and non-compliance motives. 
Another use is the so-called Compliance Monitor: a sophisticated system for a major study 
with a survey to be held among the target group with regard to the level of compliance and the 
way of enforcement. This monitor is often used for the formal evaluation of legislation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 What is the Table of Eleven? 
The “Table of Eleven” is a list of factors which are important to compliance with rules. The 
Table of Eleven can help map the strong and weak points of enforcement of and compliance 
with such rules. The Table of Eleven consists of eleven dimensions, which together decide the 
extent to which legislation is complied with. The eleven dimensions are formulated with a view 
to as high a practicability as possible in the fields of policy development and law enforcement. 
1.2 Why use the Table?
The government wants to effect changes in society by influencing the behaviour of citizens and 
businesses. One of the policy tools which the government can use to achieve this is legislation. 
With the aid of rules, the government can create limits as to what citizens and businesses can 
and cannot do. 
Legislation, however, also assumes a certain level of compliance on the part of the target group. 
Non-compliance decreases the chance of realizing the policy objective. Moreover, legislation 
is also meant to be complied with: compliance maintains the legal nature of society and 
non-compliance adversely affects that nature. 
The Table of Eleven is an aid making it possible to determine and improve compliance with 
rules, and in particular legislation, in the following ways: 
• The Table of Eleven helps to give a more accurate and well-founded estimate of the level 
of compliance of future legislation than merely an “off the cuff” approach. To that end, we 
developed estimation techniques that have a strong relation with the Table of Eleven. 
• With the help of the Table of Eleven, it is possible to systematically analyse the enforcement 
efforts3 of any enforcement body. It is also possible to estimate the potential effects of 
compliance. 
• With a checklist based on the Table of Eleven, it is possible to increase the quality of policy 
rules and legislation in the development stage. 
• The Table of Eleven can be used for setting up and evaluating enforcement. 
1.3 What is the origin of the Table of Eleven?
The Table was developed during a project studying the possibility of a monitoring tool that 
could provide insight into the level of compliance with legislation. In doing so, the question 
arose as to whether the questionnaire could also include causes of non-compliance. During 
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analysis of the various causes, the Table of Eleven was created. The Table of Eleven was not only 
used during this study to estimate the level of compliance, it also proved a suitable instrument 
to get a structured image of causes of compliance or non-compliance within a specific legislative 
area. In this monitor, the Table of Eleven was applied in a number of ways: 
- As a basis for the questions in the survey (face-to-face interviews with the target group)
- As a method of arranging information on law enforcement
- As an assessment tool in expert sessions. 
Based on the Table of Eleven, we created compliance profiles of the target group, making it 
possible to compare enforcement and compliance information. Gradually, we found that the 
Table of Eleven could be used in many different ways. 
1.4 By whom can it be used? 
The Table of Eleven can be used by policymakers, jurists drafting legislation, executive staff, 
enforcers and consultants. It can be an aid in scientific studies, in assessing the effects of a policy 
or enforcement, in preparing and evaluating policies. Each of these options for use requires its 
individual method: the study group meeting in the form of an expert session, or methods that 
are quantity-oriented, such as the survey. Sometimes, quantitative data is available from some 
dimensions of the Table of Eleven. In that case, the Table of Eleven can be used to organize this 
data and make it ready for comparison. 
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2. THE DIMENSIONS OF THE TABLE OF ELEVEN
General	premise
When analyzing the compliance behaviour with the aid of the Table of Eleven, it is important 
to have a clear idea of the target group and the legislation to be tested. With target group, we 
mean the persons or organizations (businesses) that must abide by the rules. The legislation 
to be tested, however, may be applicable to several target groups. For the practicability of a 
Table of Eleven analysis, we recommend that you opt for one target group and one or more 
core violations of the legislation to be tested. We interpret core violations as violations which 
affect the heart of the legislation and which may undermine the policy objective of the Act if 
they occur on a large scale. 
The Table of Eleven comprises eleven dimensions for compliance with legislation, which are 
divided into two groups: the spontaneous compliance dimension group and the enforcement 
dimension group. The choice for this division was made because it is easiest to recognize the 
groups from the perspectives of compliance and enforcement. Here, “enforcement” means any 
government activity aimed at encouraging compliance with legislation. 
With the Table of Eleven idea, the user applies the broad definition of the enforcement 
concept, which does not only relate to the government carrying out inspections and imposing 
sanctions (enforcement in the restricted sense). Other activities, such as providing information 
and organizing informal control structures are specified in the Table of Eleven. These activities 
directly anticipate the spontaneous compliance dimensions and are therefore very important 
for the purpose of preventative enforcement. 
2.1 The spontaneous compliance dimensions  
1. Knowledge of rules 
a. familiarity with rules 
b. clarity of rules
Definition: The familiarity with and clarity of legislation among the target group. 
Explanation:	Unfamiliarity with the rules may result in unintentional violation of them. Compliance 
mistakes may (unintentionally) be made as a result of a lack of clarity or the complexity of 
legislation. A number of aspects can be distinguished in this regard:
• Scope of legislation: on account of the fact that a great number of rules apply (or because 
one amendment to the law follows another in rapid succession), it may be too much to ask 
from those involved to know them all.
• Vagueness of legislation: definitions and stipulations may be open to more than one 
interpretation.
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• Complexity of legislation: the rules cannot be understood, for example, unless one has 
technical or legal knowledge. 
Knowing a rule well, however, does not automatically lead to good compliance. 
Knowing the rules well in some cases also means that one knows better how to commit fraud 
or duck the law (think for instance of subsidy and tax rules). 
Lack of knowledge, on the other hand, does not always lead to violation of the rules. Sometimes 
people accidentally comply with the rules simply by adapting to their environment, as in the 
case of traffic rules. Examples in this regard are being unaware of new traffic legislation or 
city ordinances, or being unable to read a traffic sign. It must be borne in mind that there may 
be illiterate individuals or foreign nationals who have not yet mastered the language. In other 
words, it does not go without saying that everybody can understand the language and therefore 
the law. 
Some legislation can be quite complicated. Compliance with environmental laws often requires 
a high level of knowledge (chemistry) on the part of the target group, which may be an 
impediment for compliance. 
Improvement	opportunities: Consider more (specific) information in general, more information 
by word of mouth or even in translation. Disseminate information through general media 
(newspapers, magazines, radio, television and the Internet) or, if it concerns a clear target 
group, via more specific media (professional journals, a special website) or by tendering advice, 
if need be via pressure groups. Consider education too. Keeping a policy/rule as simple as 
possible (for instance by limiting the number of exemptions) may also contribute to better 
compliance. 
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2. Costs/Benefits 
a. financial/economic costs and benefits  
b. intangible costs and benefits
Definition: The tangible/intangible advantages and disadvantages arising from compliance or 
non-compliance with the rule(s), expressed in time, money and effort. 
Explanation:	This concerns all financial/economic and intangible advantages and disadvantages 
of compliance behaviour. These can be expressed in terms of time, money and effort. We can 
distinguish four different categories: 
• Cost of compliance.
• Cost of violation (violation threshold).
• Benefit of compliance.
• Benefit of violation.
Intangible costs and benefits, such as maintaining a sound image, are also included in this 
dimension. The costs and benefits arising from inspection, investigation and sanctioning, both 
tangible and intangible, are not covered by this dimension. Often, the benefits of a violation 
correspond to the cost of compliance and a violation threshold often corresponds to a benefit 
of compliance.
Example: Time-consuming and costly procedures to be followed (such as applying for and 
fulfilling conditions for environmental licences) can be regarded as costs	of	compliance. In many 
cases, tax legislation causes heavy administrative burdens. 
An advantage	of	compliance	could be being granted a subsidy or businesses keeping their good 
reputation. Withholding data is a form of non-compliance, which does not require much 
effort. It is quite easy to speed over slow ramps, but it probably causes inconvenience to the 
passengers and damage to the car. Those are clearly costs of non‑compliance. Benefits	of	non‑
compliance	can often be found in the financial realm, such as receiving subsidy without officially 
being entitled to it. 
Saving effort, time and money by illegally dumping refuse rather than recycling it into an 
environmentally friendly product can be regarded as an advantage	of	violation.	
Improvement	 opportunities: Compliance can be encouraged by making a subsidy available, 
additional levies or price regulation. Other options are publishing “black lists” (of organizations 
not abiding by the rules), certification and statements regarding one’s good behaviour. 
60
EnforcEmEnt of SEvESo ii : an analySiS of compliancE DrivErS anD BarriErS in fivE inDuStrial SEctorS
3. Extent of acceptance  
a. acceptance of the policy objective  
b. acceptance of the effects of a policy 
Definition: The extent to which the policy and associated legislation are considered acceptable 
by the target group. 
Explanation:	Acceptance relates to the reasonableness (as experienced) of the policy intended 
by the government and the standards arising from it. Acceptance may relate to a target group’s 
judgement of a rule in general, but also to the judgement of the implications of such a rule 
in one’s own specific situation. The manner in which a policy is implemented may also play a 
role. Sometimes, there is a tier between the government and the citizens (professional group/
implementing body) which is essential for the design of the policy and thus of the acceptance of 
the rule. The extent to which a target group feels responsible for the realization of the policy, 
for that matter, is also an indicator of the extent of acceptance. 
Example: A low level of acceptance of a policy can be found among young people who all must 
wear a helmet on their moped or scooter under the traffic laws; only a few of them are of the 
opinion that it is a useful rule. The authorities also came up against a brick wall and resistance 
when so-called hobby hens (the owner has no commercial purposes for them) were culled 
during a fowl pest crisis. 
Some speeders do not break the law because they are in a hurry but because they disagree in 
principle with speed limits (specific or general).
The extent of acceptance may also depend on the judgements of the need for a rule or the 
scope of the damage caused. 
The manner in which a policy is fleshed out may, at times, be decisive for the acceptance of the 
legislation. This is particularly true for so-called middelvoorschriften	(a rule telling you how to 
achieve something rather than what to achieve), the purpose of which the target group may 
endorse, but not the manner set forth in the rule.
Improvement	opportunities: Involve pressure groups and influential members of the target group 
as well as implementing and enforcing bodies in the policy to be developed. Make the target 
group partly responsible for the success of the policy by way of self-regulation. 
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4. The target group’s respect for authority  
a. official authority  
b. competing authority 
Definition: The extent to which the target group respects the government’s authority. 
Explanation:	Some people just do what the government tells them to do or what the law says. 
This sub-dimension concerns the target group’s respect for authority in general. This respect 
for authority is sometimes linked to the authority of the implementing or enforcement body. 
The sub-dimension “Competing authority” does not deal with the target group’s attitude 
towards respect for the official authority, but with respect for their own standards and values, 
which may relate to their religion or habits. These may be in conflict with the government’s 
intentions. 
In general, it is true that this dimension has a more basic and continuous character than 
acceptance of policy. It relates to the more or less stable attitude of the target group towards 
the government. 
Example: Respect for authority may be found, for example, in a specific target group that 
willingly pays taxes to the state, or, more specifically, who are unwilling to do so. Other target 
groups test new legislation first for compatibility with their own religious provisions, such 
as Orthodox Christians who refuse to have their children inoculated, women who are not 
allowed to become a member of a political party or immigrants who believe that they can rely 
upon grounds for exemption from criminal liability because of their cultural background (e.g. 
acts of vengeance for reasons of family honour).
Improvement	opportunities: It is very difficult to influence this dimension. Upbringing plays an 
important role and education is possibly conducive to compliance. 
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5. Non-official control (social control) 
a. social control  
b. horizontal supervision 
Definition: The risk, as estimated by the target group, of positive or negative sanctions on their 
behaviour other than by the authorities 
Explanation:	Non-governmental control may be informal control in respect of the standards set 
or a formal kind of control by the target group or professional group of their own members. 
The latter is referred to as horizontal supervision.
Social control is also exercised by the community, inside or outside the target group: relatives, 
friends, colleagues, internal or external auditors, nearby companies, competitors. The following 
aspects play a role in social control: 
• the perceived risk of a violation being detected;
• the extent to which the community disapproves or approves the violating behaviour;
• the extent to which the community then feels responsible and takes action (social 
sanction).
Horizontal supervision is a form of formal social control: non-official control aimed at improving 
the quality of products and services within specific professional groups or industries. Consider 
for instance professional codes of conduct, certification and quality marks. 
Example: Horizontal supervision is, for instance, an audit of the books or audit performed by 
a certifying institution. 
Improvement	opportunities: Giving information to the people around the target group, so that 
they will be better equipped to detect violations. Promoting self-regulation, certification and 
quality marks issued by the trade association. 
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2.2 The enforcement dimensions 
6. Risk of being reported 
Definition: The risk, as estimated by the target group, of a violation detected by parties other 
than the authorities being reported to a government body. 
Explanation:	 This concerns the perceived risk of a violation being revealed without the 
intervention of government supervision. Consider for instance tipping off, coincidence or 
complaints. Here, several aspects mentioned in the non-official control section (T5) also play 
a role. 
Example: The risk of housing benefit fraud being revealed through anonymous tips or the 
“tipline” of the complaints number of the Dutch Inspectorate for Health Protection. Tips 
(which may be prompted by the attraction of a possible reward from the Ministry of Justice) 
may result in the discovery of violations. 
Improvement	opportunities: Setting up tiplines and improving the general availability of supervisory 
bodies, and encouraging people to report offences. 
7. Risk of inspection  
a. records inspection  
b. physical inspection 
Definition: The risk, as estimated by the target group, of an inspection by the authorities as to 
whether rules are being broken. 
Explanation:	The risk of inspection is determined by the inspection density, the number of 
inspections per, say, 100 target group members per year. The objective risk of inspection will 
in practice differ from the subjective risk of inspection for several reasons, such as knowledge 
of inspection policy and the visibility of inspections. The subjective risk of inspection is decisive 
for the extent of compliance. Often, a distinction can be made between different kinds of 
inspection (e.g. records inspection or physical inspection). 
Example: The inspection density in taxation, at least those concerning records inspections, 
is very high; in principle everybody is inspected. Continuous speed checks on the Dutch 
motorways meant a considerable increase in the inspection density. The perceived risk of 
inspection was further increased by advertising it nationwide. 
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Improvement	opportunities: When the objective risk of inspection is higher than the subjective 
risk of inspection (the target group believes that the risk of them being inspected is lower 
than the actual risk of inspection), it is wise to publish information on the risk of inspection. 
In addition, the risk of inspection can be increased by carrying out more inspections through 
making more manpower available for inspections. Finally, inspection powers can be widened. In 
that case, it is advisable to communicate this to the target group. 
8. Risk of detection  
a. detection in a records inspection  
b. detection in a physical inspection	
Definition: The risk, as estimated by the target group, of a violation being detected in an 
inspection carried out by the authorities. 
Explanation:	The violation will have to be detected in different forms of inspection. This will 
depend on the kind of violation perpetrated and the depth of the inspection. In some cases, 
it is easy to detect a violation, while it is difficult to trace the perpetrator. The objective 
risk of detection is the ratio between the number of violations detected and the number of 
violations actually committed (which number usually is unknown). It is therefore an estimate of 
the effectiveness of the means of inspection. 
Example: When an inspection is held as to whether the provisions of herbicide/pesticide 
legislation are complied with, it is worthwhile to note whether illegal chemicals are present in 
designated storage places, although their use is also illegal, as well as whether they are kept in 
other places. It is difficult to reveal such actions, as they are not tied to a specific time or place. 
Cases of oil pollution, for instance, are often quickly detected, but it often requires a great deal 
of effort to trace the perpetrator. 
Improvement	opportunities: When a new policy leads to an additional burden on the enforcement 
capacity, additional resources (e.g. for extra staff or additional training courses) must be made 
available. Consider also allocating extra powers, applying a sophisticated technique, comparing 
and exchanging data files and using combined investigation methods (records inspections and 
physical inspections). Supplying information on the “high” risk of detection applies in this case 
as well. 
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9. Selectivity 
 
Definition: The perceived (increased) risk of inspection and detection of a violation resulting 
from the selection of businesses, persons, actions or areas to be inspected. 
Explanation: This concerns the extent to which inspectors manage to inspect those violating 
the rules more often than those abiding by the law. In principle, the quality or effectiveness 
of this form of selective inspection (possibly based on risk analysis or crime analysis) can be 
measured by the ratio of the number of perpetrators in selective inspections and random 
inspections. Selection increases the probability of perpetrators being caught. This dimension is 
mainly important to analyses of enforcement; the target group will probably offset this effect 
in T7 and T8. 
Example: Some characteristics of the target group can be linked to potential violations (offender 
analyses). Inspecting a (known) group of recidivists, for example, will often lead to a higher 
number of people being “caught” than a random inspection. 
Improvement	opportunities: Examine which persons in the target group are more likely to commit 
offences, so that investigation activities can be focused on those people.
10. Risk of sanction  
 
Definition: The risk, as estimated by the target group, of a sanction being imposed if an 
inspection reveals that a rule has been broken. 
Explanation: Once a violation is detected, a sanction may be imposed by a special investigating 
team, the police, the public administration or the court. However, not every violation will make 
it to that stage. The policies relating to the dismissal of charges and whether or not an offence 
can be proved, and the policy of legitimate non-enforcement of the public administration, are 
important factors in this regard. The matter therefore concerns the target group’s expected 
chance of some sort of punishment. 
Example: The perceived risk of a sanction concerns the estimate of the target group that the 
inspection and detection of a violation will actually be followed by a sanction. Compliance will 
not be encouraged if the target group knows that it is not easy to handle the relevant violation 
administratively, that it does not have a high priority at the Public Prosecution Department 
and/or if the court’s capacity is inadequate.
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Improvement	opportunities: When a new policy leads to an additional burden for the judiciary and the 
prison system, additional resources must be made available. Make sure that the new policy is a priority 
of the investigating teams, the Public Prosecution Department and the public administration. 
11. Severity of the sanction  
 
Definition: the severity and nature of the sanction associated with the violation and additional 
disadvantages of being sanctioned. 
Explanation: The severity of the sanctions concern the duration of detention, the amount of 
the penalty or the effort needed to repair the damage incurred. Legal fees may also play a role. 
The sanctioning process may also have additional, intangible disadvantages such as the loss of 
respect/reputation as a consequence of coming into contact with justice system. 
The severity and seriousness of the different types of sanction will not have the same impact 
on all offenders/target groups. The speed and certainty of sanctioning may increase that impact 
(“tit for tat” approach) and is possibly discounted in T10. 
Example: Legislation regarding the deprivation of illegally obtained gains from criminal activities 
aims at a more serious disadvantage to the person concerned. Sanctioning a business under the 
criminal law system may affect the good name and reputation of that business. 
Improvement	opportunities: increasing the sanction, higher penalties or longer prison sentences. 
Immediate sanctioning (tit-for-tat policy) will have more effect than postponed sanctioning. 
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 3. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1 Compliance with legislation: cause and scope
When the government asks questions concerning the scope of compliance and non-compliance, 
it usually links that question to the wish to realize the highest possible level of compliance. 
If the compliance level is too low, the result may be an improved provision of information, 
an adjustment of the government policy in question, more inspections or more enforcement 
efforts. Apart from information on compliance as such, it is also of interest for the government 
to gain insight into the factors that explain the level of compliance found, i.e. insight into the 
causes. Such insight creates the possibility of intervening in those causes of poor compliance, 
if any, and that is, of course, better than treating the symptoms. Law enforcement through 
government supervision is one of the reasons why people abide by the law, but there are 
many more, as you will have read in the preceding chapter. The eleven dimensions of this 
Table together determine the extent to which an individual Act or series of Acts is complied 
with. They are the compliance causes or motives. Apart from causes, the government is often 
(though at other times insufficiently) interested in the number of compliant/non-compliant 
people. That is very difficult if not impossible to measure with the Table of Eleven. However, 
the Table of Eleven can be used for quantitative studies to estimate the levels of compliance in 
a more substantiated manner. The added value of the Table of Eleven is on the one hand the 
fact that it allows the user to divide a group into different sorts of non-compliant and compliant 
people (the so-called Compliance Estimate) and, on the other, that a Table of Eleven analysis 
gives a systematic overview of the compliance and non-compliance motives, so that a slightly 
more objective estimate can be made. These quantitative methods can be used best in ex 
ante evaluations of compliance behaviour, which by definition are surrounded by uncertainties. 
In that situation, the Table of Eleven contributes to reducing the number of uncertainties. 
 
3.2 Coherence between the different dimensions
The Table of Eleven is made up of eleven dimensions, and is not based on a single theory or set 
of theoretical notions. Several theories and theoretical notions have been used as a source. A 
list geared to practicability was the main objective in developing the tool, and selecting just one 
theory was incompatible with that objective. Fishbein and Ajzen’s theory of reasoned action 
from social psychology, for example, could have served as the basic theory. We decided against 
an explicit application of it, although elements of that theory (and those of kindred authors) 
can definitely be found in the Table of Eleven. The causal links between the different dimensions 
68
EnforcEmEnt of SEvESo ii : an analySiS of compliancE DrivErS anD BarriErS in fivE inDuStrial SEctorS
emphasized by Fishbein have been abandoned here. We use, for example, the opportunity 
theory in the dimensions covering spontaneous compliance and several enforcement dimensions, 
while the notion of the correlation between severity, certainty and speed of sanctioning (in the 
sanction sections T10 and T11) can be referred to for determining the impact of sanctioning. 
As an extension of the question as to what theory the Table of Eleven is based on, there is the 
question as to what the correlation between the dimensions is. The eleven dimensions of the 
Table are divided into two groups: 
- Spontaneous compliance dimensions consisting of the target group’s decisive motivations 
to comply with a rule, if no government control were to take place;
- Enforcement dimensions, which determine the risk of being caught in a government 
check and which determine the government’s sanctioning policy; the perception of both 
influences the compliance behaviour. 
The dimensions are categorized according to type of contribution towards compliance: voluntary 
compliance on the one hand and compliance that is more or less compelled on the other. The 
starting point is that the dimension groups each have their own effect on the inclination towards 
compliance, as do the independent dimensions. Apart from the fact that the dimensions have a 
direct effect on the inclination towards compliance, the groups also influence each other. That 
is particularly true for the enforcement dimensions. The questions regarding sanctioning (T10 
and T11) increase or reduce in pertinence according to the questions regarding inspection (T7 
and T8), and in most cases cannot exist without these inspection dimensions. After all, people 
can only be sanctioned if they were found guilty of a violation during an inspection. 
The eleven dimensions are then put in order. This means that the assumption is that each of 
the dimensions directly influences the inclination towards compliance. All the same, there may 
be a link between the various dimensions. One dimension may influence another one. We have 
already pointed out that there is a correlation between the different inspection dimensions 
(T7 and T8). It is difficult to gauge the relationships between the dimensions (the relative 
importance of each dimension to compliance) and these may differ from one law to the other, 
or from one target group to the next. Moreover, the relationship may change over time. The 
advantage realized by violating legislation governing the handling of refuse may be greater in 
three years’ time because by then processing refuse in a legal way may have become more 
expensive. This means that it is difficult to gauge or estimate the actual influence which each 
of the dimensions has on compliance. The Table of Eleven is therefore suitable for making a 
qualitative compliance analysis (strengths and weaknesses), but is less suitable for serving as a 
calculation model for the quantitative estimate of compliance and non-compliance behaviour. 
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3.3  The Table of Eleven in practical research and management processes
The government wants to effect changes in society by influencing the behaviour of citizens and 
businesses. With the help of rules, the government can create limits as to what citizens and 
businesses can and cannot do. 
Legislation, however, also assumes some level of compliance on the part of the target group. 
Non-compliance decreases the chance of realizing the policy objective. Moreover, legislation 
is also meant to be complied with: compliance maintains the legal nature of society and 
non-compliance adversely affects that nature. Part of the target group will spontaneously 
comply with almost every regulation. 
If this is not the case, the government will attempt to influence the target group’s behaviour. 
Enforcement – any government activity aimed at encouraging compliance with the rule in 
question – may contribute to compliance. 
The Table of Eleven can be used to illustrate the compliance behaviour, per core rule and per 
homogenous target group, concerning the regulation in question. Based on an estimate of the 
eleven dimensions and the step-by-step Compliance Estimate, it is possible to make an estimate 
of the level of spontaneous compliance, the required enforcement efforts and the effectiveness 
of enforcement in respect of new and existing legislation. 
Weak scores in the Table of Eleven provide policymakers and enforcers with information on 
the dimensions which are potentially linked to violation of a rule and therefore should be 
“developed” by the government. Enforcement activities (in the broad sense) have a potential 
effect on those dimensions. 
70
EnforcEmEnt of SEvESo ii : an analySiS of compliancE DrivErS anD BarriErS in fivE inDuStrial SEctorS
4. CHECKLIST FOR POLICY, LEGISLATION AND 
INSTRUMENTATION
The Table of Eleven may be used as a supportive checklist in the legislation-making and policymaking 
processes. This is especially true when the behaviour of people is a contributing factor in the policy 
objectives to be achieved. The Table of Eleven can be applied to a large part of the policy-tool 
legislation and also to some parts of criminal law. The checklist (T1 to T11) specifies points of 
attention (in the form of questions). The answers to those questions give an indication of the extent 
to which the rule can be complied with. It also lists several points of attention, which could help 
remedy certain aspects, if any, which are weak/vulnerable in terms of compliance.
4.1 Spontaneous compliance dimensions
1. Knowledge of the rules 
 Familiarity	and	clarity	of	legislation	among	the	target	group
a. Familiarity
• Does the target group know the rules?
• Does it only need to make limited efforts to find out about the rules?
• Is the legislation not too elaborate?
b. Clarity
• Are the rules formulated in such a way that the target group can understand them easily?
• Is the target group actually capable of understanding the rules?
• Is it sufficiently clear to the target group what the rules apply to?
• Is it clear to the target group what rule applies?
Points of attention 
• Use of additional educational materials.
• Use of general media (radio, TV, newspapers).
• Giving advice through workshops and trade organizations.
• Setting up a help desk for questions.
• Providing information in other languages.
• Increasing technical means to heighten visibility and simplify usage.
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2. Cost/Benefits 
The	tangible/intangible	advantages	and	disadvantages	of	breaking	or	complying	with	the	rule,	expressed	
in	time,	money	and	effort
a. Financial/economic
• According to the target group, does complying with the rules cost relatively little time, 
money or effort?
• Does it think that breaking the rules will yield little or no advantage in terms of time, 
money or effort?
• Does it think that breaking the rules could yield any disadvantages?
• Does it think that complying with the rules could yield any advantages?
b. Intangible
• Does the target group believe that complying with the rules yields emotional or social 
advantages?
• Does the target group believe that breaking the rules yields emotional or social 
disadvantages?
Points of attention
• Inspection pressure from the government (burden) can be diminished if the rules are 
abided by.
• Competitive advantages and profit can be emphasized, as well as gains in efficiency. 
• Financial rewards for compliance.
• Additional effort or costs for non-compliance.
• Physical barriers, such as fences and slow ramps.
• Emphasizing good reputations or making them visible (quality marks).
• Publish bad reputations (black lists). 
3. Degree of acceptance
The	degree	to	which	the	target	group	regards	the	policy	and	the	rules	as	acceptable
a. Acceptance of policy objective
• Does the target group regard the policy (and the principles it is based on) as reasonable?
• Does the target group feel it shares responsibility for putting this policy into practice?
b. Acceptance of effects of policy
• Does the target group regard the way the policy objective is being put into practice as 
acceptable?
• Does it regard the resulting rules that follow from this policy as acceptable?
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Points of attention
• Correct any inaccurate perception of reality among the target group.
• Provide support among the target group, trade associations and executives. 
• Provide explanation on the underlying objectives, the means used to achieve those 
objectives, the gravity of the problem, the considerations made and the issues which the 
government should and should not interfere with.
• Reasonableness of the punishment.
• Take possible arguments put forward by members of the target group into account; 
arguments such as defending their own property, privacy, right to work and income, rights 
of the environment, judgement of seriousness of offence or damage caused, division of 
power and money in society, right of the weaker opposed to the stronger, political beliefs, 
religious conviction. 
• The target group’s participation/involvement (interactive) in the policymaking process. 
4. Target group’s respect for authority
The	extent	to	which	the	target	group	is	willing	to	respect	governmental	authority
a. Official authority
• Does the target group generally abide by the rules?
• Does the target group generally have respect for authority?
• Does the target group respect the judgement of those responsible for law enforcement?
b. Competing authority
• Are the target group’s own values in line with legislation?
Points of attention
• Education.
• Attention to standards and values.
• Emphasize respect for official authority.
5. Non-governmental control (social control)
The	 risk,	 as	 estimated	 by	 the	 target	 group,	 of	 positive	 or	 negative	 sanctions	 being	 imposed	 on	 its	
behaviour	by	parties	other	than	the	authorities
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a. Social control
• Does the target group feel that any violation would soon be noticed by its community?
• Does the target group community generally disapprove of such violations?
• If so, does the community try to correct this behaviour in some way or other?
• And does this social sanction have an impact on the target group?
b. Horizontal supervision
• Is there any horizontal supervision, e.g. financial auditing, disciplinary codes, auditing for 
certification?
• Does this horizontal supervision contribute to better compliance with the standard in 
question?
• Does the target group see this horizontal supervision as an additional form of control?
• And does this horizontal supervision have an impact on the target group?
Points of attention
• Inspection possibilities by the target group or professional group.
• Visibility of violations for passers-by, stakeholders, trade associations.
• Possibilities of informal sanctions: status, image, rejection from the group.
• Loyalty of inspectors or inspecting bodies towards those inspected.
• Possibilities of (legal) pressure.
• Possibility of social control in effect encouraging violations.
4.2 Enforcement dimensions 
6 Risk of reporting
The	risk,	as	estimated	by	the	target	group,	of	a	violation	detected	by	parties	other	than	the	authorities	
being	reported	to	the	authorities
• According to the target group, is its community generally inclined to report detected 
violations to the authorities?
• According to the target group, are those exercising horizontal supervision generally 
inclined to report detected violations to the authorities?
• Does the target group think that people generally know which government department to 
report detected violations to?
74
EnforcEmEnt of SEvESo ii : an analySiS of compliancE DrivErS anD BarriErS in fivE inDuStrial SEctorS
Points of attention
• The nature of the violations: not covering one’s tracks, detection only possible by catching 
someone in flagrante delicto, whether the violation be proved (c.f. also dimension 8).
• Interest of those detecting the violation in reporting it to the authorities.
• Fear of those reporting a violation of an (angry) reaction from the perpetrator.
• Encourage reporting by tip money or opening a tipline or complaints service.
7. Risk of inspection
The	risk,	as	estimated	by	the	target	group,	of	being	inspected	by	the	authorities	for	possible	violations	
a. Records inspections
• Is there a major objective risk of records inspections?
• Does the target group think that there is a major risk of records inspections?
b. Physical inspections
• Is there a major objective risk of a physical inspection?
• Does the target group think that there is a major risk of a physical inspection?
Points of attention
• Actual objective risk of inspection (number of inspections per year or per person/business, 
number of inspections per violation or per member of the target group).
• Subjective risk of inspection and difference with the objective risk (depends on visibility 
of inspections, knowledge of inspection policy, prior experience with inspecting bodies, 
experiences of others, ideas on government activities and the impact of inspections).
• The accuracy of the inspecting body, response time of inspectors, impact of inspections by 
using auditing powers, show of strength, such as visibility of inspections, use of uniforms.
• “Reward response” from the authorities: compliance is rewarded with fewer inspections 
(and vice versa).
• Inspection burdens may invade one’s privacy, serious delays, costs to be borne by the 
person inspected. 
• Ensure that inspections are always unpredictable (otherwise people may alter behaviour 
to suit the scheduled inspection) by differentiating supervision and inspections (in the 
fullness of time) in terms of (1) frequency, (2) time, (3) depth and (4) place.
• Always hold a number of random inspections. Doing so keeps them unpredictable but also 
ensures that everybody always runs the risk of being subjected to an inspection. Moreover, 
random inspections produce objective input on the degree of compliance, in contrast to 
selective inspections, where usually relatively more violations are detected. 
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8. Risk of detection
The	risk,	as	estimated	by	the	target	group,	of	a	violation	being	detected	if	the	authorities	inspect
a. In a records inspections
• Is all the data being checked in a records inspection?
• Is it easy for the inspectors to detect violations?
• Is it difficult to falsify records?
• Is there a major objective risk of detection in a records inspection?
• Does the target group think that there is a major risk of detection in a records 
inspection?
b. Physical inspections
• Is everything being checked in a physical inspection?
• Is it easy for the inspectors to detect violations?
• Are violations restricted to a particular place and/or time?
• Is the inspection technology used sophisticated enough?
• Is there a major objective risk of detection in a physical inspection?
• Is the objective risk in a physical inspection large?
Points of attention
• The nature of violations (not covering one’s tracks, detection only possible by catching 
someone in flagrante delicto).
• Camouflaging violations (by screening off, hiding, changing the composition of indications 
of a violation, by misleading the inspector).
• Possibilities of tracing who the actual perpetrator/responsible person is (consider legal 
structures, making the actual perpetrator not the legal addressee, the causal link between 
the violation and perpetrator is missing). 
• The capacity of the investigating body: special expertise of techniques required, sufficient 
resources available at the investigating body.
9. Selectivity
The	perceived	increased	risk	of	inspection	and	detection	of	a	contravention	resulting	from	selecting	the	
businesses,	persons,	actions	or	areas	to	be	inspected
• Do offenders have the impression that they are always inspected more frequently than 
those who comply with the rules?
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• Do selective inspections find more offenders, relatively speaking, than non-selective 
inspections?
• Does the target group believe that the enforcement agency is capable of “separating the 
chaff from the wheat”?
Points of attention
• Targeting.
• Violation ratio in random and selective inspections.
• Cost of the discovery of a violation.
• Possibilities of setting up databases.
• Possibilities of linking files from various enforcement organizations.
10. Risk of sanction
The	risk,	as	estimated	by	the	target	group,	of	a	sanction	if	a	violation	is	detected	in	an	inspection
• Is there a major objective risk of a sanction being imposed once a violation is detected?
• According to the target group, is it easy to prove a violation?
• Does the target group estimate the risk of a sanction as a result of a detected violation as 
being high?
Points of attention
• Lack of capacity.
• Lack of evidence.
• Social relevance of the offence (policy to dismiss charges).
• Legitimate non-enforcement policy of the enforcement body.
• Errors in the implementing or enforcement bodies.
11. Severity of the sanction
The	severity	and	type	of	sanction	associated	with	the	violation	and	additional	disadvantages	of	being	
sanctioned
a. Severity of sanction
• Does the target group know what sanction they face in the event of a violation?
• Do they regard it as severe?
• Is the sanction imposed quickly (tit for tat)?
• Does the enforcement of the sanction have any additional tangible or intangible 
disadvantages for the party concerned?
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b. Damage to reputation as a result of the sanction
• Does the target group mind that it becomes known that it has been sanctioned?
Points of attention
• Disadvantages of sanction for the party concerned.
• Types of sanction: penalty, damages, goods seized, deprivation of illegally obtained profits, 
imprisonment, restore to legal situation, alternative punishments, withdrawing rights and 
favours, bringing business operations to a halt, etc.
• Additional disadvantages of enforcement.
• Social status, reaction of community, court fees, legal fees, costs of furnishing proof.
• Financial capacity of the perpetrator.
• Psychological effects, such as the manner of presentation and public nature, the speed with 
which a sanction is imposed, the “appearance” of the sanction system applied: criminal law, 
disciplinary rules, administrative law, private law. 
• Possibilities of alternative sanctions. 
4.3 Golden rules of the Table of Eleven
1. Compliance behaviour is determined by a few core dimensions rather than by the 
correlation of all dimensions: 80% of compliance behaviour is determined by 20% of 
the dimensions (the core dimensions, which may vary from violation to violation). Try 
to find the core dimensions for the legislative area in question that can influence your 
organization. 
2. Properly filling in the dimensions requires knowledge of the target group: the relevant 
background characteristics must be mapped. 
3. A cause for non-compliance may be found in the discrepancy between the objective values 
of dimensions (such as the actual risk of being caught) and the subjective judgements in the 
target group. It is therefore important to make that distinction and know the difference.
4. Influencing one dimension in order to increase the degree of compliance will usually not be 
successful. Effective behavioural changes normally require influencing all core dimensions, 
therefore opt for an integrated strategy.
5. Dimensions may be “averaged” among the whole target group. On the other hand, there 
may also be various sub-target groups, with each sub-target group giving the dimensions a 
different valuation. In that case, you will need to tailor the use of preventative or punitive 
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instruments.
6. Target groups are dynamic and change in the course of time. Compliant people may slip 
into the category of (potential) perpetrators due to the blurring of moral standards. 
Combating that situation requires presenting the compliant people and non-compliant 
people alike with a form of “confirmation of standards” every now and then. This means 
that part of the inspections must always be random.
7. The manner in which implementation and enforcement issues are introduced in the 
policymaking process to a large extent determines the practicability and enforceability of 
legislation. It is therefore important that those issues are discussed as early as possible in 
the policymaking process.
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5. TABLE OF ELEVEN COMPLIANCE PROFILE
To estimate the weak and strong points of compliance with a rule or policy (whether existent 
or future) with the help of experts, a Compliance Profile can be drawn up. In that case, 
the dimensions of the Table of Eleven are divided into dimensions encouraging violation or 
promoting compliance. Some dimensions may have both an encouraging effect on both violation 
and compliance. This depends on the target group on which the rules have a bearing. Therefore, 
it is always necessary to carefully define the “target group” and the “rules” in question before 
drawing up a Compliance Profile. 
The Compliance Profile shows the strong and weak points of the 11 dimensions. Dimensions 
with a strong score in the compliance profile encourage violations; those with a weak score 
do not promote compliance. Dimensions which fall in those zones are vulnerable and require 
extra attention in the policymaking and legislation-making processes. Dimensions which have 
a low score with regard to encouraging violations and are strong in promoting compliance are 
(relatively) safe dimensions. 
In general, many vulnerable dimensions will be an indication of a high percentage of perpetrators 
and many safe dimensions will indicate a high level of compliance. This does not, however, 
always apply. The importance of a single safe dimension may sometimes outbalance many weak 
ones. In other words, be careful in drawing conclusions regarding the degree of compliance.
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6. COMPLIANCE ESTIMATE
The so-called Compliance Estimate was developed to obtain a more substantiated insight into 
the potential number and types of people complying or not complying with the rules. With this 
method, the target group is divided step by step into a number of different kinds of violating and 
complying people. It is, for instance, possible to place people within different categories:
1. Unconsciously compliant people: those who do not know the rules very well and who 
unknowingly comply with them (for instance because they copy other behaviour, such as 
people do in traffic).
2. Unconsciously non-compliant people: those who break the rules because they do 
not know the rules well. 
3. Spontaneously compliant people: those who know the rules and would comply with 
them of their own accord, even if (in theory) there was no enforcement whatsoever.
4. Spontaneously non-compliant people: those who know the rules and would always 
break them spontaneously, regardless of the risk of inspection, the risk of detection, the 
risk of punishment or the severity of the potential punishment. 
5. People deterred by enforcement or calculatingly compliant people: the people 
who know the rules and who would break them but, rather, decide against doing so due 
to enforcement activities. 
6. Consciously or calculatingly non-compliant people: those people who knowingly 
break the rules and consciously accept the risk of being caught. 
7. In addition to the groups described above, there is a group that will not be influenced, or 
is very hard to influence. This group can be either very respectful to authority (the good 
ones) or very disrespectful to authority (the bad ones).
For an overview, consult the organizational chart. The chart, however, is not complete. All 
motivations from the Table of Eleven that can explain compliance are included, but some 
disturbing variables can occur between the intention	 to comply with rules and the actual 
compliant	 behaviour.	These variables can also be linked to a specific situation (e.g. physical 
barriers, chance opportunities) or may have to do with irrational actions (violating a rule by 
accident, not being accountable for one’s actions). It is therefore conceivable that the outcome 
of the estimate has to be adjusted for these variables. The chart could make this visible by 
adding arrows, which enables “cross-fertilization” between those who are ultimately violating 
the rules and those who are complying. A person can, for instance, violate a rule knowingly, 
but ultimately comply with it, and vice versa. These complicating factors have been left out for 
reasons of clarity.
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The Compliance Estimate is now based on the unravelling of the relationships in the chart by 
answering a number of specific questions. This technique, however, is complicated and requires 
a lot from the respondent. The Compliance Estimate technique is processed in a computer 
system, making it better and easier to use.
The result could, for instance, be as follows:
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ANNEX 6 Results regarding the usefulness of the 
Table of Eleven
Usefulness of Table of Eleven
One of the sub goals of the MJV was to test the Table of Eleven as a discussion tool and 
subsequently ask the users about their experiences with the method. The usefulness of the 
Table of Eleven was one of the issues to be reported on by the working groups.
The working groups unanimously concluded that the Table of Eleven is a good tool that 
incorporates a systematic approach and process tfor starting discussions on particular issues. 
The results are clearly presented. It should be used in a group: the discussion is as important 
as the instrument. The presence of a representative of the target group is crucial. The tool can 
also be used very well for the ex ante evaluation of regulations.
The tool is generally accepted as useful, but some improvements can be made. The strengths, 
weaknesses and recommendations that emerged from the discussions are listed below: 
Strengths
•	 Good for starting a discussion and creating a common language.
•	 Structures the discussion and helps in directing focus on the right things.
•	 Diagnostic tool for problem-solving.
•	 Instrument for designing regulations in general.
•	 Distinction between spontaneous and enforced compliance is clear.
•	 User-friendly.
•	 Clear results.
•	 Graphs are useful and in line with the expectations, providing an indication as to what 
to focus on in enforcement.
Weaknesses
•	 Time-consuming method.
•	 Not a good tool in terms of proactivity because target group and rule must be very 
specific. This is essential to having a good discussion.
•	 The tool is really effective only for particular and/or detailed rules.
•	 No distinction between short and long-term effects.
•	 Must be used in a group with appropriate representatives. 
•	 Steps must be taken to ensure that the discussion is as important as the tool itself.
•	 A limited trial relating to the Seveso Directive in its entirety showed that the tool may 
not be sufficiently selective for the Directive as a whole.
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•	 The Table of Eleven makes a number of artificial assumptions, such as the assumption 
that it is possible for neighbors of a company to know that it is violating the rule in 
question.
•	 Sometimes understanding the questions or the grounds on which they are based is 
difficult due to a lack of clarity.
•	 The checklist and estimate mode have limited or no added value. The checklist can 
help in understanding the question being answered in the test mode.
•	 A number of issues must be clarified before the tool is used.
Recommendations
•	 Use for EU legislation or Directives.
•	 To be used for core violations only (maintenance, domino effects, notification).
•	 Include suggestions on interventions in the elements, giving the possibility to discuss 
interventions in direct relation with the elements.
•	 Make use of the tool during the drafting of legislation.
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ANNEX 7 Report of working group 1
“Accidents will happen and all accidents can be prevented.”
Definition	of	the	target	group
The target group of working group 1 was defined as follows: Oil refineries, including the storage 
of the finished product, excluding the storage of raw materials. Furthermore, petrochemical 
industries are not included. There are approximately 5-6 refineries in each Member State 
represented in the working group (Norway, Sweden, UK, Romania, Poland, Netherlands).
Conclusions	regarding	the	usefulness	of	the	Table	of	Eleven
•	 A good way of structuring a discussion.
•	 Introduces a good basis for a common language.
•	 Question whether it should be applied to the Seveso II Directive, as it is mainly 
goal-oriented.
•	 Not possible to distinguish between short term and long term.
•	 Checklist: 2.1-2.4 and 2.5-2.6 are not fully independent.
•	 Test: Delete “more” in 4.2.
Lessons	learned	for	Europe
•	 There are no major differences between the Member States in the working group.
•	 It is an international industry.
•	 Approaches in terms of regulation are quite similar.
•	 Self-compliance factors are very important; enforcement factors are hardly needed.
•	 International exchange of inspectors would be beneficial.
•	 Enforcement must be cost-effective.
•	 The management of change concept cannot be viewed in terms of short-term 
thinking.
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Results	for	rule	1:	Notification
Strengths
1. Spontaneous compliance
•	 Public perception is very important.
•	 Refineries are large establishments and cannot hide; authorities and the public know 
where they are.
•	 The press is active with respect to refineries, going into authorities’ decisions in-depth 
and exposing violations to the public.
•	 Sometimes the notification process helps the refinery to clarify the actual amounts 
of dangerous substances present (Romania). This might lead to the shutting down 
of certain parts of the establishment, resulting in a situation in which the Seveso 
Directive is no longer applicable and thus contributing to a greater level of inherent 
safety. (It was noted by Poland that this does not entirely apply to refineries but is 
true for storage facilities).
•	 The question is whether a notification is reassuring for the surroundings or creates 
a sense of insecurity once people know that there is a potentially dangerous 
establishment next door.
•	 It is impossible to inspect absolutely everything; completeness of the notification can 
be an issue.
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2. Respect and authority
•	 There is general respect for government rules (Romania).
•	 In Sweden and Norway, an agreement between an inspector and a company is drafted 
when an instance of non-compliance is detected. The agreement concerns actions 
to be taken by the company in order to ensure compliance. In 95% of the cases, no 
further action is needed; 5% of the cases lead to an official enforcement decision by 
the government.
•	 Large organizations like refineries can afford to retain staff that can keep the regulator 
at a distance; the staff can also interpret the rules in line with business goals.
•	 Sometimes, the HSE coordinator asks for a formal notice of non-compliance to 
be issued in order to secure a budget from management to fund certain measures 
(Norway).
3. Horizontal control
•	 Internal assessments, ISO 14000 and insurance assessments are not incompatible 
with Seveso goals, but are no guarantee that those goals will be reached.
•	 Large companies sometimes feel that they have to comply and be the best in this 
regard (Norway/Sweden).
•	 Horizontal supervision can contribute to compliance, but can also contribute to an 
illusion of safety.
•	 A saturation point can be reached with all these different audits. In Sweden, an 
establishment remarked that the inspector found all the non-conformities detected 
earlier by the insurance company and the certifying company. The inspector, however, 
was for free!
•	 Horizontal supervision is crucial because of its integrating effect (Poland).
•	 In Norway, the frequency with which an establishment was visited was related to 
having a safety management system (SMS). The quality of the certifying companies 
was low, because they rushed their work. As a result, this procedure is no longer 
followed in Norway.
•	 It is the input for an SMS and the first principles that are most important, not the SMS 
itself (UK).
•	 An SMS is no guarantee for safety.
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Weaknesses
4. Access for the public
•	 Members of the public do not know exactly whom to call when they suspect the 
existence of a non-conformity, partly due to the delegation of competences.
•	 In Romania, the government, in close cooperation with refineries, communicates 
actively with the public. Companies are obliged to report non-conformities.
General remarks and questions
5. Classification
•	 Classification of substances is difficult and confusing, partially because of the ADR 
classification.
•	 Aggregation of different substances and mixtures is difficult.
•	 What should be done with regard to intermediate products? In Sweden, there was 
a discussion about bio fuels: ethanol-gasoline mixtures were fully classified in such a 
way that every gasoline pump became a Seveso establishment.
•	 Do actual quantities (Sweden) or capacities (UK, NL) determine whether an 
establishment fall within the scope of the Seveso Directive?
6. Miscellaneous 
•	 Can small companies hide?
•	 Can small companies afford a good staff?
•	 How to cope with cross-border (in)consistency?
•	 Respect is earned by the competence and knowledge of the inspector (“Do not send 
a novice to a refinery, it will eat him alive!”).
•	 It is, however, necessary to have enforcement powers: you need a (big) stick in the 
trunk of your car / you need the teeth to bite.
•	 Active business relations can also contribute to compliance, e.g. Volvo urged an oxygen 
delivery company to comply within the hour when Volvo was told by the authorities 
of a non-compliance concerning an oxygen storage tank for testing purposes.
•	 When a company adopts a “We shall have no non-compliances” policy, the labelling 
of violations as a non-compliance during an inspection becomes a problem; violations 
labelled as observations and recommendations meet less resistance (Norway). 
•	 An active community or press contributes to compliance; enforcement powers are 
needed.
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Interventions relating to rule 1
No interventions needed; there is a high level of spontaneous compliance.
Only the access for the public is poor.
Results	for	rule	2:	Scenarios
The findings on the “scenarios” subject do not differ much from the findings on the “notification” 
subject. No interventions needed; there is a high level of spontaneous compliance. Only the 
access for the public is poor.
Additional remarks:
•	 There are national guidelines and manuals that elaborate the abstract Seveso 
requirements.
•	 It takes considerable effort to comply with the rule: approximately 1 man-year during 
a 6-month period.
•	 It does not pay for refineries to break the rule; in contrast to, perhaps, “1-scenario 
companies” (e.g., LPG).
•	 There is a debate on what scenarios are proportionate.
•	 Social control [i.e., fear of a negative public perception] is impossible in the UK 
because of national security; in other countries the safety report is still public. There 
is not much interest in safety reports. However, indications in the media are that 
a refinery that does not draw up scenarios is very likely to meet with the public’s 
disapproval.
•	 Intra-company supervision is very important.
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Results for rule 2: Scenarios
The findings on the “scenarios” subject do not differ much from the findings on the “notification” subject. No 
interve tio s needed; ther  is a high level of spo taneous compliance. Only the access for t  public is 
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Additional emarks: 
x There are national guidelines and manuals that elaborate the abstract Seveso requirements. 
x It takes considerable effort to comply with the rule: approximately 1 man-year during a 6-month 
period. 
x It does not pay for refineries to break the rule; in contrast to, perhaps, “1-scenario companies” 
(e.g., LPG). 
x There is a debate on what scenarios are proportionate. 
x Social control [i.e., fear of a negative public perception] is impossible in the UK because of 
national security; in other countries the safety report is still public. There is not much interest in 
safety repor s. However, indications in the media are that a refinery that does not draw up 
scenarios is very likely to meet with the public’s disapproval. 
x Intra-company supervision is very important. 
x Flaws in the details in scenarios are very hard to detect. 
x Small flaws in the scenarios will result in recommendations by the authority; large omissions will 
result in immediate, severe enforcement action. 
x A near miss reporting system can be used to validate the scenarios. 
x There is a difference between US company standards and EU company standards. 
x Selectivity (T9) is very difficult when choosing scenarios. 
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•	 Flaws in the details in scenarios are very hard to detect.
•	 Small flaws in the scenarios will result in recommendations by the authority; large 
omissions will result in immediate, severe enforcement action.
•	 A near miss reporting system can be used to validate the scenarios.
•	 There is a difference between US company standards and EU company standards.
•	 Selectivity (T9) is very difficult when choosing scenarios.
Results	for	rule	5:	Management	of	change
The findings on the “management of change” (MOC) subject do not differ much from the 
findings on the previous subjects. Not many interventions are needed; there is a high level 
of spontaneous compliance. Only the access to the public is poor and there is a negative 
cost-benefit ratio. From a short-term point of view, it might pay to avoid the MOC procedure. 
In the long term, however, a good MOC procedure is always advisable. Inadequate MOC is the 
cause of many incidents.
Additional	remarks
•	 If MOC has only been introduced recently, there might be some undetected changes 
from the past.
•	 There are national guidelines and manuals that elaborate the abstract Seveso 
requirements. However, it is difficult to identify a change.
•	 MOC procedures should be pragmatic.
•	 Rewards for the employee following MOC procedures help to improve compliance.
•	 In extreme situations, employees might report MOC violations to the authorities.
•	 It is very hard for an inspector to detect small changes that have not been reported.
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Results for rule 5: Management of change
The findings on the “management of change” (MOC) subject do not differ much from the findings on the 
previous subjects. Not many interventions are needed; there is a high level of spontaneous compliance. 
Only the access to the public is poor and there is a negative cost-benefit ratio. From a short-term point of 
view, it might pay to avoid the MOC procedure. In the long term, however, a good MOC procedure is 
always advisable. Inadequate MOC is the cause of many incidents. 
Additional remarks
x If MOC has only been introduced recently, there might be some undetected changes from the 
past.
x There are national guidelines and manuals that elaborate the abstract Seveso requirements. 
However, it is difficult to identify a change. 
x MOC procedures should be pragmatic. 
x Rewards for the employee following MOC procedures help to improve compliance. 
x In extreme situations, employees might report MOC violations to the authorities. 
x It is very hard for an inspector to detect small changes that have not been reported. 
Possible interventions relating to rule 5
x Disseminate good practices, share information. 
x Increase lev l of concern at corporate management level about safety culture. 
x Gather evidence on cultural level. 
x Involve line management in improving culture. 
x There are only limited enforcement possibi ities for “soft” factors, e.g. it is difficult to prove “high 
risk of violation” in court. Issuing an improvement notice might raise awareness in the press and 
on the shop floor. 
x Do we need human factor specialists to complement th  inspection team? 
x Do we need specialists on automated process control (black box)? 
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Possible	interventions	relating	to	rule	5
•	 Disseminate good practices, share information.
•	 Increase level of concern at corporate management level about safety culture.
•	 Gather evidence on cultural level.
•	 Involve line management in improving culture.
•	 There are only limited enforcement possibilities for “soft” factors, e.g. it is difficult 
to prove “high risk of violation” in court. Issuing an improvement notice might raise 
awareness in the press and on the shop floor.
•	 Do we need human factor specialists to complement the inspection team?
•	 Do we need specialists on automated process control (black box)?
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ANNEX 8 Report of working group 2
Definition	of	the	target	group
The working group had discussions with a target group in mind, namely a large multinational 
pharmaceutical organization. In practice, this is a company of medium size with a limited number 
of employees. In the pharmaceutical industry, hygiene and quality are the main focus, but safety 
is also covered. Reputation is an important issue. Upper-tier companies have to submit a safety 
report to the government that is inspected. In general the targeted rules are more applicable 
to upper-tier than lower-tier sites.
Lower-tier sites are different in terms of inspection frequency and record inspection. They 
do not have to submit a safety report, nor their MAPP or SMS documentation. They will 
therefore have a lower score on inspection frequency for record inspections. In some countries 
upper-tier sites are more frequently inspected than lower-tier ones. In other countries it is the 
other way around.
The most important aspect for the pharmaceutical industry seems to be the reputation issue, 
which is in most cases responsible for spontaneous compliance with the rules. For unclear 
rules, enforcement is, however, more relevant and needed than for others. The difference 
between the three rules analyzed and actual compliance with these rules is made visible in the 
pie charts. 
Quality is one of the main issues in production, in accordance with Good Manufacturing 
Practice (GMP). Quality is considered consistent with good health and safety management. 
Other relevant characteristics are good citizenship, being a good employer and attractive 
to the best employees, flexible production possibilities, a lot of minor and major changes in 
production every few years and production of often very active substances which can cause 
health problems if released in large amounts.
Conclusions	regarding	the	usefulness	of	the	Table	of	Eleven
•	 Useful aid for structural thinking and focusing on the right things.
•	 Time-consuming method.
•	 Good diagnostic tool for problem-solving.
•	 Not a good tool in terms of proactivity because target group and rule must be very 
specific.
•	 Good instrument for designing regulations in general.
•	 Distinction between spontaneous and enforced compliance is clear.
•	 Checklist and estimate mode have limited or no added value. The checklist can help 
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in understanding the question being answered in the test mode.
•	 From the estimate mode, one will obtain a rough idea about how many of the target 
group will spontaneously comply; one can acquire insight into where efforts must be 
directed.
•	 It was found that some intervention approaches were suggested as solutions more 
often than others. 
•	 It is a user-friendly instrument.
•	 The Table of Eleven makes a number of artificial assumptions, for example, that it is 
possible for neighbors of a company to know that it is violating the rule in question.
•	 There are a number of mistakes in the Table of 11 software program (translations, 
incorrect scoring labels).
Conclusions	regarding	lessons	learned	for	Europe
Some aspects are very difficult to comply with for industry and also very difficult in terms of 
enforcement by inspectors. An example in this regard is accident scenarios.
•	 These rules should be made clearer in Seveso III.
•	 It would be good to have an EU instrument that defines the rules more clearly. 
•	 The existing instruments, books, websites and other information should be spread 
more actively within and between Member States. These instruments, however, do 
not always fit with the national implementation models.
•	 A number of Member States do not have the space and capacity to help the industry 
and develop models and information material. This should be done more at European 
level to ensure the creation of normative instruments; share the new inspection 
method of the Netherlands or NTA 8620 in Europe, for instance.
•	 More international exchanges between inspectors on enforcement issues, as a part of 
central training.
•	 Better communication on changes in the regulations (classification).
•	 More emphasis on Seveso inspector competences, promoted at EU level. The working 
group believes this will be a cost-effective way to improve the quality of inspections.
•	 Seveso inspectors’ website for exchanging experiences.
Other comments
Companies should be more open to the public and give members of the public a look into the 
“black box” of dangerous substances and associated risks (responsible care, corporate social 
responsibility). MJVs are useful for the exchange of information.
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Results	for	rule	5:	Management	of	change
In the discussion, the rule is explained as the obligation to have procedures on management of 
change (MOC) and reporting these procedures in the Safety Report and the MAPP.
In some cases, the practical implementation of MOC was discussed.
The results obtained by the working group through filling in the Table of Eleven instrument for 
this particular rule are given in Figure 1. It is very clear that compliance with this rule is not a 
major problem for the pharmaceutical industry, since it sees the direct profit of having a good 
MOC procedure. Some elements are scored as “not applicable” due to considerable differences 
existing between working group members. These subjects are seen as weak points.
Figure 1. Results of Table of Eleven for rule 5: Management of change
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Strengths
•	 The pharmaceutical industry target group sees the advantage of having an MOC 
procedure, not only for major accident prevention. Also for insurance reasons, it is 
necessary to have a good score (excellence) in safety management. MOC is one of 
the key issues insurance companies look at. 
•	 Adding specific procedures in an existing quality system should be easier.
•	 Quality, as well as efficiency and some other factors, can also be positively affected by 
implementing an MOC procedure.
•	 Reputation issues like credibility, the risk of more inspections and being caught 
violating the rule encourage compliance with all the rules.
•	 The target group clearly accepts the aim of the policy, which is that they should have 
MOC procedures. Lack of clarity regarding MOC regulations makes the standard 
arising from the policy less acceptable.
•	 The pharmaceutical industry cares about what people think of it in terms of its efforts 
to be a good citizen and a good example, and so automatically follows the rules of 
the authorities. In some Member States the fear of enforcement alone is enough to 
ensure compliance.
•	 Internal standards are very important, and these function in support of this rule.
•	 All safety reports are inspected. MOC is an important issue targeted routinely by 
inspectors. The description of MOC does not always provide enough information to 
firmly demonstrate compliance. In the Netherlands, a checklist is used that specifies 
every point that must be included in the report.
•	 Inspectors are likely to check the MOC procedure and implementation when 
inspecting Seveso companies. The manner and depth of the inspection, however, 
depend on the level of expertise and inspection resources; considerable effort is 
required to carry out the inspection properly.
•	 The system of selectivity (i.e., prioritizing inspection of sites considered low safety 
performers or higher risks) works in practice but authorities do not inform companies 
that they are doing well and are therefore being inspected less. Systems are not 
transparent for companies. The pharmaceutical industry is not the most dangerous in 
terms of major accident probability, so fewer inspections should be carried out.
•	 Sanctions differ considerably among Member States. Authorities in some issue 
warning letters first and the institution of legal proceedings is a comparatively distant 
remedy, but other Member States have a very strict system which does not allow the 
issuance of warning letters first on clear violations. Prosecution is then immediate if 
the company in question does not have an MOC procedure in accordance with the 
law.
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Weaknesses
•	 The target group is aware that it has to have an MOC procedure, but this is not 
something that is easy to comply with. It is comparatively easy to adapt a plant by 
changing a number of lines or connections, but there is a risk that this is not seen 
as a major change. Often, the procedure is not used in case of minor changes or 
organizational changes. Implementation is therefore a problem. In some countries, 
like Italy, the law explains what is expected much more clearly than in other countries, 
where only the text of the Seveso Directive is copied and no further explanation is 
provided.
•	 Due to differences in transposition of the Directive into national law, a number of 
items are not applicable as a result of differences between countries regarding how 
much clarity the law should provide.
•	 It is rather complex to implement the MOC due to problems relating to varying 
interpretations of the definition (or lack thereof), and the information and 
documentation its implementation often requires. It takes a lot of time and effort to 
implement the MOC procedure.
•	 Companies within the pharmaceutical industry do not audit each other due to the 
“trade secret” factor.
Interventions
•	 Although companies in the pharmaceutical industry do not seem to need 
enforcement, it is still important for companies manifesting high levels of compliance 
to be inspected by competent staff. (In the UK companies even have to pay for 
inspections, so competent staff is even more of a requirement.) Nonetheless, 
companies in this sector generally know whether they are doing well in terms of 
compliance and keep abreast of changes in legislation and the interpretation of 
authorities in this regard.
•	 Using trade associations is a good way of disseminating information and promoting 
spontaneous compliance.
•	 A spontaneous compliance level of 80% suggests that enforcement efforts should 
concentrate on the remaining 20%. These efforts may include:
o	 Advertising and raising awareness about the likelihood of inspection 
(especially through trade associations)
o	 Applying a clear targeting policy (selectivity)
o	 Applying a clear sanctioning policy (affecting reputation)
•	 The ombudsman has a role in inspections (contacted by the trade union involved).
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Other comments
With respect to Sweden, the obligation of having procedures is clear but the communication 
aspect of MOC is very complex. Changes have to be reported to four different authorities 
and none of them have the legal obligation to send this information to each other. If even one 
organization is overlooked in the distribution of information, it may experience considerable 
difficulty, even if the other three have received the information.
Rule	1:	Submitting	a	notification
This rule concerns the requirement to submit a notification and the information that should 
be in it. There was some discussion about differences in the way this rule is implemented in 
national laws. It is hard to get the proper information for the notification because classification 
of substances (intermediates, mixtures) and calculation of quantities (maximum, allowed, 
normal, average, capacity) are not always straight-forward. For the pharmaceutical industry, 
the problem of mixtures and intermediates can be even greater than for other industries.
Results	of	the	Table	of	Eleven
6
Rule 1: Submitting a notification
Thi  rule co erns the requirement o ub it a notification and the informatio  that sho ld be in it.   
There was some discussion about differences in the way this rule is implemented in national laws. It is 
hard to get the proper information for the notification because classification of substances (intermediates, 
mixtu es) and calculation of quantities (maximum, allowed, normal, average, capacity) are not always 
straight-forward. For the pharmaceutical industry, the problem of mixtures and intermediates can be even 
greater than for other industries. 
Results of the Table of Eleven
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Strengths
The notification is a rather simple administrative rule about which most companies are indifferent. 
This attitude is often deliberate and even can represent a strategic decision. . Moreover, some 
discussions will arise between the operator and the authorities because companies often see 
the requirement to submit a notification as simply one more administrative obligation; the 
government has already been given the information in other ways and formats.
However, because of the potentially negative effect on reputation from non-compliance, 
willingness to comply remains an advantage. 
Weaknesses
There are differences between the rules in the Member States, such that it may be more 
difficult to collect the proper information for the notification. In some Member States, this 
information is already in the environmental permitting process. In other Member States, the 
maximum allowed quantities are not automatically available.
Unanticipated changes in the classification of a particular dangerous substance at European 
Level (via procedures laid down in Council Directive 67/548/EC) sometimes cause confusion 
and substantial disruption to operator compliance efforts. Communication in this regard should 
be improved. Sometimes even the regional competent authorities are not aware that something 
has changed.
When performing a physical inspection, the inspector has to be well-informed about the 
possibility that companies with dangerous substances may be Seveso companies. Some 
companies, whose Seveso status is not immediately clear, can easily hide from the authorities.
Interventions
•	 Promote discussion on the benefits and social value of Seveso II compliance.
•	 Make notification easier by using a standard (possibly electronic) form, with clear 
instructions. 
•	 Make it easier to find out the Seveso classification for substances. Advertize the 
existing website http://ecb.jrc.it/classification-labelling/search-classlab/.
•	 Ensure better communication with specific target groups and regional inspectors 
about changes in Seveso classification, thresholds (class 9) and new substances. .
•	 Engage in joint problem-solving with industry and authorities, though there can be 
cultural and time/resource problems in this regard.
•	 The probability of detection through physical inspection can be improved through 
increasing awareness and encouraging feedback from non-Seveso inspectors.
•	 Establish a special help desk for companies to help them find out if they are Seveso 
companies.
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Other	comments
The unloading and storage of solvents is the principal reason that the pharmaceutical industry 
falls under the scope of the Seveso Directive. The amounts of chemicals that companies in 
this industry produce can be the reason, but for these substances, it is easier to keep under 
the Seveso threshold.
New Member States are not bothered by the differences between the original Seveso 
I Directive and the Seveso II Directive, so they often have less difficulty in obtaining 
notifications from this sector. Rule	2:	Major	accident	scenarios
This rule is about the selection, description and reporting of major accident scenarios. It 
requires a major effort to comply with this rule and it costs a lot of money. Generally, if one 
wishes to do it properly, input from experts inside or outside the company (consultants) is 
necessary.
Results
8
Rule 2: Major accident scenarios
This rule is about the selection, description and reporting of major accident scenarios. It requires a major 
effort to comply with this rule and it costs a lot of money.   Generally, if one wishes to do it properly, input 
from experts inside or outside the company (consultants) is necessary. 
Results
100
EnforcEmEnt of SEvESo ii : an analySiS of compliancE DrivErS anD BarriErS in fivE inDuStrial SEctorS
Strengths
The policy itself makes sense, as it helps to generate insight into the risks.
Violation of this rule is not likely to be reported because it is not likely to be detected by a 
third party.
Scenarios are the most important building block relative to the operator’s Seveso obligations, 
so they will always be targeted for inspection. It is, however, hard for the regulator to see 
if something is missing in the scenarios since detailed information and understanding of site 
operators is required for this analysis.
Weaknesses
These rules are very difficult to comply with because of the lack of clarity as to how compliance 
should be achieved. There is some literature, but there is no standard method for assessing 
risk. There are many conflicting methods and consultants all have their own techniques. 
Interpretation is difficult and dependent on expert advice.
This rule is not well-aligned to the needs of the company. It is never quite clear whether the 
right scenarios have been selected. On the other hand, this can be an advantage for companies 
because inspectors cannot easily disapprove and assert that the rule is being violated.
There are a number of differences in approach among the Member States in particular in regard 
to the physical inspection of major accident scenarios. In some Member States, only a paper 
inspection is carried out, while in others a physical inspection appears to be the more common 
approach.
Looking only at the safety report does not usually yield the whole picture. It is a difficult 
process to produce the scenarios and also to detect missing scenarios. Disagreements about 
which ones should be highlighted often arise, even between experts.
When physically inspecting scenarios, it is necessary to have a high level of technical knowledge 
and understanding to detect violations. 
There are differences in the approaches taken by Member States with regard to sanctioning. 
Some steer towards prosecution if scenarios are lacking. Interpretation-related issues such as 
the number of scenarios required and their quality can make it difficult to prove that there is 
in fact a violation, however, and direct prosecution is not possible. In this situation, companies 
receive an enforcement letter intended to motivate them to improve. The penalty imposed 
in the UK and the Netherlands is the obligation to improve or resubmit the report, if not, 
prosecution is the next step.
One Member State requires that matters be improved in the next safety report, whereas 
others use an enforcement notice. One Member State reported that significant sanctions were 
never imposed.
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Interventions
•	 Making the rule more clear and improving enforceability.
•	 Providing better guidance (models, examples that work or have worked in practice, 
example methodologies) on what the major accident scenarios should contain. 
Exchange these through trade journals.
•	 Referring industrial parties to specialized consultants who know about the specific 
processes present on site.
•	 Supporting public training courses.
•	 Publishing FAQs on a central website.
•	 Electronic newsletter for all Seveso companies and Seveso professionals (consultants, 
inspectors etc).
•	 Talking to trade organizations and/or sites stressing the benefits of scenarios.
•	 Promote joint problem-solving with a view to creating sector-specific solutions.
•	 Carrying out physical inspections to cross-check the written scenarios.
•	 Improving training and guidance for inspectors as to how to inspect this rule.
•	 Publishing the fact that physical inspections are being carried out to cross-check 
scenarios.
•	 Publishing the results of inspections and enforcement letters.
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ANNEX 9 Report of working group 3
Definition	of	the	target	group
Fertilizer	production	and	(process)	storage
Profile: An international manufacturing (process) and storage fertilizer plant.
The main objective of the (large) production plant is to utilize natural resources for manufacturing 
ammonia and methanol petrochemical products. The plant manufactures between 100-1000 
MT/day of both ammonia and methanol. A granular urea plant is constructed in addition to help 
widen the business spectrum through downstream development. The on-site facilities include 
ammonia and methanol storage and urea silos.
Conclusions	regarding	the	usefulness	of	the	Table	of	Eleven
With regard to the usefulness of the tool: 
The group generally agreed that the Table of Eleven is a good tool that offers a systematic 
approach and process to facilitate discussion on particular issues. The following points were 
highlighted:
- The tool enables results to be presented clearly.
- The tool should be used in a group (rather than by individuals).
- The discussion it generates is as important as the instrument.
- The presence of a representative of the target group (of the rule) is crucial.
- The tool may also be used very well for ex ante evaluation of regulations.
Results	for	rule	4
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ANNEX 9 Report of working group 3 
Definition of the target group
Fertilizer production and (process) storage 
Profile: An international manufacturing (process) and storage fertilizer plant. 
The main objective of the (large) production plant is to utilize natural resources for manufacturing ammonia 
and methanol petrochemical products. The plant manufactures between 100-1000 MT/day of both 
ammonia and methanol. A granular urea plant is constructed in addition to help widen the business 
spectrum through downstream development. The on-site facilities include ammonia and methanol storage 
and urea silos. 
Conclusions regarding the usefulness of the Table f Eleven
With regard to the usefulness of the tool:  
The group generally agreed that the Table of Eleven is a good tool that offers a systematic approach and 
process to facilitate discussion on particular issues. The following points were highlighted: 
- The tool enables results to b  presented clearly. 
- The tool should be used in a group (rather than by individuals). 
- The discussion it generates is as important as the instrument. 
- The presence of a representative of the target group (of the rule) is crucial. 
- The tool may also be used very well for ex ante evaluation of regulations. 
Results for rule 4
Conclusions regarding rule 4
x The charts and discussion indicate a sector that cares more for reputation than for legal 
compliance. In fact, there are motivating factors for violating the rules. The group cited the 
following potential reasons:  
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Conclusions	regarding	rule	4
•	 The charts and discussion indicate a sector that cares more for reputation than for 
legal compliance. In fact, there are motivating factors for violating the rules. The 
group cited the following potential reasons: 
o	 training needs (relating to rule 4) are perceived as having relatively low 
added value for the industry
o	 sanctions for violations are relatively low
o	 “soft” requirements (such as training) are not regarded as being as important 
as “hard” factors (mainly technical measures).
•	 A gap in knowledge between the authority and the enterprise, with the enterprise 
considering that it is much more knowledgeable about the production process than 
the authority. This situation also encourages violation of the rule. In particular, it is 
difficult for the inspector to identify gaps in the application of rule 4 (assessment of 
training needs).
•	 Inspectors must also be attentive to security concerns associated with the presence 
of ammonium nitrate.
Conclusion	regarding	rule	5
The fertilizer industry is rather conventional with respect to production techniques. Changes in 
production methods take place over longer periods. These “minor” changes (or apparently minor 
changes) in particular are an important issue: they may lead to high risks (for example, the Toulouse 
disaster, one of the causes of which was an off-spec product). Bigger changes, such as the construction 
of a new plant, are easier to identify and are usually addressed in a more standard way.
Results	for	rule	5
Conclusions	regarding	rule	5
2
o training needs (r lating to rule 4) are perceived s having relatively low added value for 
the industry 
o sanctions for violations are relatively low 
o “soft” requirements (such as training) are not regarded as being as important as “hard” 
factors (mainly technical measures). 
x A gap in knowledge between the authority and the enterprise, with the enterprise considering that 
it is much more knowledgeable about the production process than the authority. This situation 
also encourages violation of the rule. In particular, it is difficult for the inspector to identify gaps in 
the application of rule 4 (assessment of training needs). 
x Inspectors must also be attentive to security concerns associated with the presence of 
ammonium nitrate. 
Conclusion regarding rule 5
The fertilizer industry is rath r conventional with res ct to production techniques. Changes in production 
methods take place over longer periods. These “minor” changes (or apparently minor changes) in 
particular are an important issue: they may lead to high risks (for example, the Toulouse disaster, one of 
the causes of which was an off-spec product). Bigger changes, such as the construction of a new plant, 
are easier to identify and are usually addressed in a more standa d way. 
Results for rule 5
Conclusions regarding rule 5
x There is a tendency to overlook (seemingly) small changes in production and handling processes.  
x Management of change is usually applied to major, obvious changes but changes in maintenance 
practices may often be overlooked. There is also a concern in dealing with “1 for 1” (or “like for 
like”) substitutions in the process which the operator may not necessarily categorize as a change.  
x Small changes are hard to identify using written records. The probability of detection depends on: 
o the presence and quality of the MOC procedure, as prepared by the company  
o the scale of the change  
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•	 There is a tendency to overlook (seemingly) small changes in production and handling 
processes. 
•	 Management of change is usually applied to major, obvious changes but changes in 
maintenance practices may often be overlooked. There is also a concern in dealing 
with “1 for 1” (or “like for like”) substitutions in the process which the operator may 
not necessarily categorize as a change. 
•	 Small changes are hard to identify using written records. The probability of detection 
depends on:
o	 the presence and quality of the MOC procedure, as prepared by the 
company 
o	 the scale of the change 
o	 the (technical) abilities of the inspector, and the inspection technique 
applied (asking the right questions of the right people).
•	 an important part of the MOC procedure is selecting and executing a certain type of 
risk analysis, e.g., a HAZOP for major changes, an FMEA for minor changes. Assuming 
the procedure is followed and the risk analyses are completed, the probability of 
detection is relatively high.
Lessons	learned	for	Europe
1. The tool could be used by the European Commission. It also could be used 
by global organizations (for different types of rules), either internally or in 
cooperation with other stakeholders or other competent authorities. 
2. Organize training courses at EU level, e.g., for EU inspectors on particular issues 
or topics.
3. The identification of waste companies with dangerous substances was identified 
as a major issue.
4. Seemingly minor rules that are in fact of importance may intentionally be 
disregarded that is, not considered as relevant for major hazards, but in fact they 
can be important for particular cases (e.g., MOC in the fertilizer production 
industry). 
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Summary	of	interventions
Rule Checklist 
Test no.
Interventions
4 7 – 11 Change the mindset of inspectors: raise the profile of the training of 
personnel (inspectors) with respect to major hazards.
7 – 11 Set up confidential reporting systems for employees.
7 – 11 Improve the training of inspectors and enhance understanding of 
process and hazards risks within the fertilizer industry in order to 
improve the quality of inspections.
7 – 11 Some Member States have identified a need to increase the training of 
inspectors for the inspection of SMS.
7 – 11 Split up inspection plans (and inspections) into a technical inspection 
and a management inspection; dedicated focus on training.
7 – 11 Launch network (or industry survey) to identify and register the 
number and severity of industrial accidents and near misses (to 
review the importance of training). “Drivers” to set up this initiative 
expected from inspections.
5 General Prepare guidance documents for operators as well as training 
programmes for operators.
7 Scrutinize breakdown records to gain insight into the number and 
severity of breakdowns, in particular as regards the link to safety 
(data mining).
3b Involve the sector in question in the creation and evaluation of the 
(national) rules.
3b Investigate the role and effect of NGOs, not for a single establishment 
but for the fertilizer sector as a whole (even though the sector is not 
particularly “sexy”).
4b Raise awareness within the inspectorates, in particular with regard 
to the security risks (explosives), i.e., the vulnerability of the sector. 
Communicate (example) with the Ministry of Defence or the Ministry 
of Interior. Discussions about countermeasures will raise safety 
awareness in the sector in general.
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ANNEX 10 Report of working group 4
Main	conclusions
Spontaneous compliance for the batch processing target group is relatively high for the 
rules considered (3 and 4). The expectation is that this applies for most rules. The level 
of knowledge of the rules is high. Respect of government authority is relatively high and 
recommendations are usually followed up. The probability of violations being detected during 
inspections is high. Quality criteria for the interpretation of compliance with certain rules are 
lacking and form the subject of discussions with the companies.
Results	for	batch	processes
Description	of	the	target	group
The batch processing sector consists of a wide variety of companies. There are differences in 
products, differences in terms of organization and differences in the scale of the companies. 
The rate of change is high, especially as regards the effect of changes in the ownership of 
these companies. The processes can have a high degree of complexity.
It seems that there are small and big Seveso companies. The smaller companies are usually 
independent (Belgium, Croatia). The big companies are usually part of a larger (parent) 
organization and have their own SHE members of staff, with production taking place in 
various countries. The big companies were defined as the target group.
Results	for	rule	3
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ANNEX 10 Report of working group 4 
Main conclusions
Spontaneous compliance for the batch processing target group is relatively high for the rules considered (3 
and 4). The expectation is that this applies for most rules. The level of knowledge of the rules is high. 
Respect of government authority is relatively high and recommendations are usually followed up. The 
probability of violations being detected during inspections is high. Quality criteria for the interpretation of 
compliance with certain rules are lacking and form the subject of discussions with the companies.
Results for batch process s
Description of the target group
The batch processing sector consists of a wide variety of companies. There are differences in products, 
differences in terms of organization and differences in the scale of the companies. The rate of change is 
high, especially as regards the effect of changes in the ow er hip of these companies. Th  proc sses can 
have a high degree of complexity. 
It seems that there are small and big Seveso companies. The smaller companies are usually independent 
(Belgium, Croatia). The big companies are usually part of a larger (parent) organization and have their own 
SHE members of staff, with production taking plac  in various countries. The big companies were defined 
as the target group. 
Results for rule 3
Conclusions regarding rule 3
x Test results are mainly positive (green area). 
x The objective of the rule enjoys a high degree of acceptance. 
x Enforcement is not the most important reason for compliance: 50 % of the target group comply 
spontaneously.
Results for rule 4
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Conclusions	regarding	rule	3
•	 Test results are mainly positive (green area).
•	 The objective of the rule enjoys a high degree of acceptance.
•	 Enforcement is not the most important reason for compliance: 50 % of the target 
group comply spontaneously.
Results	for	rule	4
Conclusions	regarding	rule	4
•	 On the whole a positive score.
•	 Weak points: T6 (risk of reporting), T10 (selectivity: training is a “soft” aspect).
•	 80 % spontaneous compliance, the remainder comply after enforcement.
6
Conclusions regarding rule 4
x On the w ole a positive score. 
x Weak points: T6 (risk of reporting), T10 (selectivity: training is a “soft” aspect). 
x 80 % spontaneous compliance, the remainder comply after enforcement. 

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Results of testing rule 3
Work title: batch_rule3 
Editor: J. van Dijk 
Last changed on: 2006.11.09 
Official name of rule Assessment of the extent and severity of consequences (of identified 
major accidents)
Type of rule: Seveso II 
Target group: batch processes 
 
Results of the Table of Eleven test
T1 - Knowledge of the rules
1.1  How much does the target group know about the rules? 8 Austria: 8 - 10 Holland: 8 - 10 
Belgium: 7 discussion about scenarios Germany: 8 - 10 Lith: 8 - 10 Spain: 7 Croatia: 6 - 7 
 
1.2  In the target group’s opinion, are the rules clear? 8 Sp: yes, but different points of view 
between industry and inspectorate - 8 L: 8 methodology clear? G: 7 - 8 B: target group has 
a view about how to comply - 9 A: 8 discussion in congress C: 4 - 5 government does not 
provide much information, score = 8 note: lower in Croatia!
 
T2 - Advantages/Disadvantages
2.1  In the target group’s opinion, what does it take to comply with the rule in terms of time, 
money and effort? 8 C: 8 A: 6 “they forget the consequences”, why? B: 8 “they forget the 
consequences for the environment!” G: 8 L: +- 8; quality of evaluation of the consequences 
is a discussion point Sp: 6 - 8, see remark B 
 
2.2 In the target group’s opinion, what is the advantage of breaking the rule? 8 
 
2.3  In the target group’s opinion, how much does it cost to break the rule? 1 difficult 
question! 
 
2.4  According to the target group, how much advantage is there in complying with the rule? 5 
High advantage, as it can cost a lot more in the future. A good assessment is the basis for the 
right measures. This is what we mean. How do people within the industry think? Average 
score for the target group.
2.5  To what extent does the target group find complying or not complying with this rule 
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important for its reputation? 7 B: 8 A: 8 L: 7 Sp 7 -8 C: 5, more important for the head 
office, less in C itself G: 8 
 
T3 - Degree of acceptance
3.1  To what extent does the target group regard the policy objective as reasonable? 7 explanation 
to the target group is necessary! Target groups do not always want to communicate.. Note 
about rating: it is not correct, very reasonable = 10, indifferent = 0?! A: 8 - 9 S: 6 - 8 G: 7 
H: 7 B: 6 L: 6
 
3.2  To what extent does the target group regard the standard arising from it as acceptable? 1 
Probably low or indifferent. What is the influence of Seveso? Members of the target group 
are not really aware of the underlying philosophy. 
 
T4 - Faithfulness of the target group
4.1  To what extent is the target group in general inclined to do what the government asks it 
to do? 8 N, B, G: >8 L: C: 9 be aware of the time required by the target group, depending 
also on economic factors.
 
4.2  To what extent does the target group feel that its own cultural or religious standards and 
values are in competition with those of the government? 4 methodology is an issue, e.g. 
qualitative or quantitative assessment? A: <4 N: 4 C: 4 S: 4 L: 4
 
T5 - Non-official control
5.1  Does the target group believe that its community (neighbours, colleagues, competitors, 
relatives, passers-by etc) - knowing that the target group breaks the rule - is likely to call 
the group to account for its behaviour? 3 Remark: they look at other Seveso companies. 
It depends on the sector in question. Look at accidents. Look at economic factors L: not 
common to do so S: 2 - 3 G: 2 - 3 A: 2 C: 3 N: 4 
 
5.2  To what extent does the target group experience horizontal supervision as an additional 
form of supervision of the rule? 3 OHSAS certification could help (not many) ISO 14.001 
could help (many) A: 2 - 3 B: 3 N: 3 G: 2 - 3 C: 4 S: 3 
 
T6 - Risk of being reported
6.1  In the target group’s estimation, how high is the risk of the government learning about a 
violation other than through government supervision? 1 quite low A/G/B: 0 
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T7 - Risk of inspection
7.1  In the target group’s estimation, how high is the risk of the government inspecting the 
records to see whether legislation is or is not being complied with? 7 target group 
members experience it as high. S: 6 - 8 only administrative L: 7 - 8 G: 8 B: 7 - 8 A: 7 C: 8 
 
7.2  In the target group’s estimation, how high is the probability of the government carrying 
out a physical inspection to see whether legislation is or is not being complied with? N.A. 
 
T8 - Risk of detection
8.1  Assuming that someone broke a rule, how high is the risk, in the target group’s 
estimation, of the government - when inspecting the records referred to in 7.1 - detecting 
the violation? 8 L: 9 C: 6 A: 8 G: 9 B: 8 N: 8 It is very likely to find the violation. We need 
competences and time to make good detections. The industry can “hide” the violation. 
The group has different views on this matter! 
 
8.2  Assuming that someone broke a rule, how high is the risk, in the target group’s 
estimation, of the government - when carrying out a physical inspection referred to in 7.2 
- detecting the violation? N.A. 
 
T9 - Selectivity
9.1  To what extent does the target group feel that the enforcement strategy used is successful 
(in the sense that offenders are inspected more frequently than those complying with the 
rules)? 7 general inspection strategy on EU level is available. Most companies know this 
strategy. Not in Austria. The Netherlands also has its own strategy, as does Belgium. It is 
not very clear if the target group knows. The target group is aware of the behaviour of the 
inspector. Inspections are announced. Results are generally reported. C: 6 - 7 A: 7 B: 9 G: 
8 L: 7 S: 7 N: 8 
 
T10 - Risk of sanction
 10.1 How high is the risk, in the target group’s estimation, of a detected violation actually 
resulting in the imposition of a sanction? 5 In historical terms in the Netherlands: going from 
negotiating to “police officers”. Again back to the first strategy, think before enforcement. L: 
sanctions are not likely for this rule; more for technical violations G: low C: 6 B: 9 ! A: 1 G: 4 
S: 5 L: 4 N: 6 
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 T11 - Sanction - severity
 11.1  How does the target group experience the sanction that is usually imposed for breaking 
this rule? 3 Netherlands: only criminal sanctions are applicable, not administrative ones. 
Members of the target group are afraid of having to go to court. Belgium: permit is 
withdrawn because of not having a management system in place: 5 L: administrative: 5 C: 
4 A: 1 G: 1 - 2 S: administrative: 4 - 5 
Results of testing rule 4
Work title: batch processes 
official name of rule identification of training needs 
Results of the Table of Eleven test
T1 - Knowledge of the rules
1.1  How much does the target group know about the rules?  
8 
Is it clear for the target group what the identification of the training is?
 
1.2  In the target group’s opinion, are the rules clear? 
6 Not completely. 
Some training programmes are available. 
 
T2 - Advantages/Disadvantages
2.1  What does it take to comply with the rule, in terms of time, money and effort, in the 
target group’s opinion? 8 
 
2.2 In the target group’s opinion, what is the advantage of breaking the rule? 2 
2.3 In the target group’s opinion, how much does it cost to break the rule? 7 
 
2.4  According to the target group, how much advantage is there to complying with the 
rule? 9 the motivation for technical training is higher than, for example, for awareness, 
emergency or safety training.
 
2.5  To what extent does the target group find complying or not complying with this rule 
important for its reputation? 7 
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T3 - Degree of acceptance
3.1 To what extent does the target group regard the policy objective as reasonable? 7 
 
3.2 To what extent does the target group regard the standard arising from it as acceptable? 7 
 
T4 - Faithfulness of the target group
 4.1  To what extent is the target group in general inclined to do what the government asks it 
to do? 8 
 
4.2  To what extent does the target group feel that its own cultural or religious standards and 
values are in competition with those of the government? 3 
 
T5 - Non-official control
 5.1  Does the target group believe that its community (neighbours, colleagues, competitors, 
relatives, passers-by etc) - knowing that the target group breaks the rule - is likely to call 
the group to account for its behaviour? 0 
 
5.2  To what extent does the target group experience horizontal supervision as an additional 
form of supervision of the rule? 7 
 
T6 - Risk of being reported
 6.1  In the target group’s estimation, how high is the risk of the government learning about a 
violation other than through government supervision? 1 
 
T7 - Risk of inspection
 7.1  In the target group’s estimation, how high is the risk of the government inspecting the 
records to see whether legislation is or is not being complied with? 8 
 
7.2 I n the target group’s estimation, how high is the risk of the government carrying out a 
physical inspection to see whether legislation is or is not being complied with? 8 Austria: 
low score, not many inspections are carried out with respect to this “soft” aspect. 
Croatia: inspections on behavioural aspects carried out by different competent 
authorities; training is one of the aspects. 
Belgium: training as a safety manager, 1 day a week, 2 years. 
Germany: less training than B/H 
Netherlands: ISO certified, examples will be sent. 
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T8 - Risk of detection
 8.1  Assuming that someone broke a rule, how high is the risk, in the target group’s 
estimation, of the government - when inspecting the records referred to in 7.1 - detecting 
the violation? 6
 
8.2  Assuming that someone broke a rule, how high is the risk, in the target group’s 
estimation, of the government - when carrying out a physical inspection referred to in 7.2 
- detecting the violation? 7 
 
T9 - Selectivity
 9.1  To what extent does the target group feel that the enforcement strategy used is 
successful (in the sense that offenders are inspected more frequently than those 
complying with the rules)? 2 
 
T10 - Risk of sanction
 10.1  How high is the risk, in the target group’s estimation, of a detected violation actually 
resulting in the imposition of a sanction? 3 the chance for a sanction being imposed is 
low, but when an emergency situation has occurred it is a different matter. 
This is not so much a violation: too “soft”.
 
T11 - Sanction - severity
 11.1  How does the target group experience the sanction that is usually imposed for breaking 
this rule? 7 They find it hard, as members of the target group/the inspectors do not 
really see it as a violation.
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ANNEX 11 Report of working group 5
Description	of	the	target	group
LPG storage companies engage in different types of activities, including the storage and filling of 
aerosol applications. In addition to Seveso companies, the specific inspectorates that supervise 
Seveso legislation in some Member States also inspect companies with lower threshold values, 
e.g., Ireland and Finland setting the threshold at 5 tons.
The LPG sector is very familiar with safety regulations, as these were already set decades ago. 
Compliance levels on technical measures based on that specific legislation seem to be high. LPG 
storage is a comparatively simple process.
The sector, and specifically the larger companies/multinationals, is very familiar with and 
knowledgeable about the safety regulations. Therefore, rules set within their own context are 
often more easily followed than the rules set by the authorities. Very small companies, even 
within the scope of the Seveso Directive, are less knowledgeable but may adopt rules set by 
the authorities more easily.
For T11 sessions, the LPG storage sector consists specifically of the local/regional operating 
companies and the (un)loading of LPG. The number of employees of those kinds of companies 
varies from between 5 up to about 30 persons. Multinationals were separately assessed 
where feasible or necessary for the assessment of strengths and weaknesses and for selecting 
intervention mechanisms. 
The filling of cylinders, storage and filling of aerosol applications, refineries and ship offloading 
have been excluded in the definition of the target group. 
Image is not a very important driver for the LPG sector, although some aspects, such as 
promoting the clean aspects of LPG, are image-sensitive. Image in relation to safety is perceived 
in different ways; i.e., safety at the site is not specifically sensitive to public opinion. However, 
when LPG is used as an energy source in the domestic sphere and an accident happens, the 
public can be very skeptical about the LPG sector.
The LPG sector is not a proactive sector, but slow and resistant to change. Clear rules and 
economic aspects influence the implementation of specific requirements. Companies in the 
sector only do the minimum that is asked by the authorities and usually a stick is needed to force 
them to change. Multinationals tend to be more proactive because of their own (worldwide) 
standards.
Conclusions	regarding	the	Table	of	Eleven	as	a	tool
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Conclusions
•	 Interesting and complete tool; to be used as a problem-solving/clarifying tool; 
questions stimulate discussions.
•	 In its present form, the tool is somewhat tedious to use, specifically when using it for 
rules being investigated separately.
•	 Graphs are useful and in line with expectations, giving an indication on where to focus 
in enforcement.
•	 Assessing non-compliance with the tool is a useful activity.
Recommendations
•	 More effective at higher level (policy/regulation as a whole) and not at the level of 
specific rules/articles.
•	 Include suggestions on interventions in the elements, giving the possibility to discuss 
interventions in direct relation with the elements.
•	 Reporting option should be improved and comments should be automatically 
included.
•	 Interaction between the checklist module and the test module (verifying the scores 
given).
•	 Tool will have to be used within an expert group; discussion is required. Not to be 
applied by a single inspector.
•	 Make use of tool during the drafting of legislation.
General remark: During the assessment of the T11 tool, the group agreed to fix the time 
period at the moment directly following the entry into force of the Seveso II Directive, which 
meant that the point in time at which operators would have to face the new requirements. 
The compliance rate at this moment naturally differs in comparison to compliance levels at 
the present time, in which operators as well as authorities have gained more experience and 
knowledge of the specific Seveso requirements and how to fulfil them. In addition, companies 
at the present time are aware of the authorities’ enforcement and sanction structure and will 
(positively or negatively) anticipate it.
Main	conclusions	regarding	intervention	strategies
Agencies operate on a relatively individual basis. A more integrated approach involving combined 
enforcement could increase the level of compliance (more applicable to ATEX than Seveso).
Intervening in the market is a mechanism that does not work in promoting compliance with 
ATEX, PED and machine-related rules, as too much efforts is required to build up a technical 
dossier to have a product taken out of the market. This effort (and associated costs) cannot 
be borne by the authority. 
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Interventions should be proposed with specific elements of the obligations in mind, giving the 
possibility to discuss interventions directly in relation to the elements targeted.
Enforcement in general is still too much defined by (recent) accidents or public pressure, and 
not always systematically planned. Seveso is one of the few directives that requires a systematic 
and periodic inspection approach.
There is only a limited understanding of regulations on the part of operators and the guidance 
provided to them is also limited. This means that operators have to be informed more and 
also be informed more in advance in order to increase spontaneous compliance. First, general 
information has to be given during the implementation phase, afterwards to be followed by 
sector-specific practical information. 
Enforcement actions are often served under general (labor or environmental) legislation and 
not on the basis of the Seveso Directive, as the latter is a very difficult piece of legislation to 
enforce (too many general descriptions, not specific enough).
Lessons	learned	for	Europe
•	 Interesting and informative discussions; MJVs have added value.
•	 Differences in the approach to and implementation (translation into national 
legislation) of Seveso still occur.
•	 Practical application in addition to knowledge of national legislation is essential for 
exercising supervision with respect to the Seveso Directive and related legislation.
•	 There is a need for Seveso inspectors to have a strong technical background as well 
as experience in the field.
•	 Competences need to be strengthened (persuasive, decisive, strong personality).
•	 Training on health and safety management systems is necessary.
•	 EU-wide standards for inspectors on HSE training are needed.
Other	considerations
•	 Do we really make a difference? 
•	 Has safety increased over recent years due to the Seveso Directive? 
•	 Is all the energy expended by authorities in line with the results achieved? 
•	 Seveso has been positive in emergency planning, involving other stakeholders, and in 
the cooperation with spatial planners etc.
Rule	2:	Major	accident	scenarios	(Article	6,	paragraph	1)
Knowledge levels of both industries and authorities is higher among multinational companies 
than it is in the smaller, local/regional-oriented companies, the latter having to face new 
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regulations and requirements that they did not have to comply with before the introduction 
of Seveso II. Due to the limited capacity at these companies, expertise is often outsourced to 
consultants.
Results	for	rule	2
The drafting of major accident scenarios is a time-consuming and thus costly requirement that 
does not lead to any (perceived) advantage for the company other than compliance with this 
specific Seveso rule. Not performing a risk assessment is therefore saving costs, as no costs are 
associated with non-compliance. As this requirement is an administrative task that cannot in 
all cases be traced through the publication of a report, detection of non-compliance by other 
groups is unlikely. 
There are emotional/social advantages in selectively complying (underestimating consequences) 
for companies that have to provide (publicly available) safety reports. Pressure groups can also 
play a role in terms of the way in which emotional (dis)advantages are perceived. Scenarios 
are also applied in land use planning; e.g.,densely populated areas and questions relating to 
who came first, “industry or inhabitants”, thus influencing the perception of emotional/social 
advantages.
Member States can develop an enforcement strategy that specifically takes Seveso requirements 
into account or set up a more integrated system, e.g, including IPPC enforcement as well. 
According to the Seveso Directive, the inspection mechanism should, however, be independent 
from (non-)compliance with the safety data reporting requirement. 
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Rule 3 on the assessment of the extent and severity of the consequences of identified major 
accidents will probably lead to the same conclusions as reached for rule 2. Rule 3 has therefore 
not been applied for the target sector.
As the working group wanted to evaluate some of the “soft” requirements of the Seveso 
Directive as well as some elements of the safety management system, the group decided that 
the requirements regarding operational control would form very interesting subject matter for 
investigation on the basis of the Table of Eleven.
Interventions	relating	to	rule	2	concerning	unfamiliarity	and	lack	of	clarity	(T1)	
Interventions defined for major accident scenarios are the following:
	 Create and publish guidance material for companies.
	 Make information available on websites such as l’Association Europeénne des Gaz de 
Pétrole Liquéfiés (AEGPL, www.aegpl.com) as umbrella organization for national LPG 
associations; inventory of industries within this sector.
	 Hold meetings with companies (sectors) and informing them about these requirements.
	 Encourage use of approved software, improve description of functionalities.
	 Training of inspectors on sector-specific issues; building more competence for motivating/
imposing compliance (“terrier mentality”).
Rule	X:	Operational	control	(to	a	lesser	extent	also	we	took	into	consideration	rule	5,	management	of	change)
Written instructions as required by Seveso and other specific national regulations sometimes 
do not exist (oral instructions instead) or are often copied from multinationals. Sometimes, ISO 
systems have been implemented, in which case formal written instructions do of course exist.
During first inspections, the existence of such instructions is ascertained. Later inspections 
focus on the content and the issues that have to be addressed in the written instructions such 
as maintenance, safety measures, personal protective measures, and very specific operations 
(sampling and water draining). This means specific skills are required on the part of the 
inspector.
Results	for	rule	X
The consequences of copying instructions from other companies are that instructions often 
do not represent the reality (not tailored to the situation in question) and that operators do 
not fully understand the contents of the instructions. Physical inspection is therefore needed in 
addition to an administrative check. 
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Larger companies have a better insight into the requirements for instructions that generate 
performance as intended, since they have people dedicated to these tasks. At smaller companies, 
the requirement of drafting written instructions and procedures means a considerable effort 
due to time pressures, low margins, less personnel and a lack of experience in drafting as such. 
Smaller companies regard technical issues as more important than this kind of administrative 
requirement, which, as technical issues constitute their core competence, they experience as 
a burden.
In addition, small companies do not consider the drafting of instructions as necessary, as they 
know their business very well and undergo only limited changes in process and personnel. In 
some cases they consider oral instructions to be enough. Written instructions are not part of 
daily practice; they do not have a strong link to a hands-on and practical mindset. 
The only horizontal control consists of checks through suppliers or ISO certification. 
Administrative inspection consists of checking test certificates and not always specifically the 
written instructions. Administrative inspection can be part of a physical check. The rule relates 
to the existence of written instructions, the (quality of the) content of the instructions and 
their implementation in practice. The inspector needs to be very familiar with the sector and its 
operations to be able to ask for the relevant instructions. Interpretative ability and knowledge 
of the sector on the part of the inspector is very important in checking instructions. The 
detection of violations depends on the knowledge and experience of the inspector.
The probability of a violation being detected is greater at the beginning, as the focus is on its 
actual existence and not specifically on the content of the written instruction. This initial phase 
requires less knowledge on the part of the inspector. Persistence is, however, required on the 
part of the inspector – a “terrier mentality” – for focusing in-depth on all instructions after the 
requirement has already been in operation for a longer period.
Companies complain that they are inspected by specific Seveso inspectors (with specific skills) 
because they are Seveso companies, comparing themselves in this regard with non-Seveso LPG 
companies. The selectivity element of T11, number 9, is therefore not really applicable. Remarks 
on inspections of other sectors are not specifically relevant or reflective of companies.
Compliance with this rule does not lead to higher levels of safety and enforcing this rule strictly 
is overly punitive as a first measure. Only increasing the severity of the sanction can lead to 
compliance with the rule. The industry is aware that it is not severely sanctioned for initial 
non-compliance with the requirement of instructions. A sanction will be imposed not because 
of non-compliance with this specific rule, but more for not acting in accordance with the 
requests of the authority more generally. It can be useful if companies are informed by their 
sector organization, federation or gas supplier as part of daily operations. For instance, a 
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Member State could elaborate the ATEX Directive. This elaboration would be backed up by a 
practical example that would serve as a useful rule to illustrate the T11 process.
Interventions	relating	to	rule	X
Interventions relating to non-compliance with the written instructions requirement would 
have to be focused on the cost-benefit ratio (spontaneous compliance) and on the probability 
and severity of sanctions (enforcement dimension). However, according to the working group, 
it would be best to focus on sanctioning rather than on preventative measures.
Interventions	relating	to	the	cost‑benefit	ratio	(T2)
•	 Informing the neighborhood through negative publication facilitates social pressure 
on the company.
•	 Pressure of the members of sector organizations or (upstream) suppliers requiring 
compliance, also in relation to management systems. Explain and substantiate the 
benefits to these stakeholders.
Interventions	relating	to	probability	and	severity	of	sanctions	(T10	and	T11)
•	 Use administrative fines for “soft” requirements of the Seveso Directive such as the 
written instructions requirement.
•	 In severe cases, a “blame and shame” instrument after administrative sanctions did 
not have the expected effect. Intensifying the inspections is a possible option (in some 
countries these inspections are even charged to the company, leading to a financial 
driver in addition to the time constraints).
•	 Build up a dossier on other infringements in which this non-compliance issue can be 
addressed as well.
Combination	of	preventative	and	repressive	interventions
•	 Seminars with industry groups, clarifying conditions, the quality expected and the 
(inspection and enforcement) steps that will be taken after a certain period.
Rule	Y:	ATEX	in	relation	to	LPG	storage,	including	cylinder	filling	
ATEX is more reality-driven than the Seveso Directive, as it deals with a higher probability 
of accidents. This regulation is therefore more easily accepted by operators than the Seveso 
Directive, which deals with risks of a completely different dimension/probability. This specifically 
accounts for the electrical source requirements, but less for the non-electrical.
Results	for	rule	Y
The practical consequences of the ATEX requirements regarding non-electrical ignition sources 
(12) are not clear to the target group. The electrical requirements are clear, however, as they 
have been applicable for a long time.
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Complying with ATEX rules is very expensive, e.g., for the non-electrical sources. Existing 
equipment may have to be replaced in order to be in compliance with the new regulation or 
additional equipment may have to be installed, resulting in interruptions to daily operations, 
the need to look for new suppliers and so on (considerable efforts). Finally, the risk assessment 
that has to be carried out is a costly requirement. There is no advantage for the operator in 
complying with the ATEX rule spontaneously.
ATEX as a policy is known and more or less accepted by the LPG sector. Effects of the ATEX 
policy, meaning the obligation to comply with all its specific requirements, are less accepted 
due to the burden such compliance entails, especially with regard to the requirements relating 
to non-electrical ignition sources. Mechanical (non-electrical) sources have seldom led to risks, 
and complying with these (new) requirements is far less accepted by the sector.
Insurance inspectors inspect compliance with a number of ATEX-related requirements. In 
addition, operators can receive a reduction of insurance premiums if they periodically produce 
inspection reports stating satisfaction of requirements. This might act as a positive incentive 
for compliance.
The sector is aware that inspectors will ask for the explosion-protection documents. The 
probability of a violation being detected is rather high. The documents that must, by law, be 
drafted are very specific and are easily checked and verified by the inspector. The documents 
can be easily checked during a physical inspection. The zoning (with the exception of the EX 
mark) and mechanical requirements are more difficult to inspect.
ATEX is new legislation for authorities as well as industries. The level of expectation in the 
target group with regard to enforcement and sanctioning is therefore not very high. The risk 
of being sanctioned is higher relative to certain Seveso rules because some ATEX elements are 
easier to inspect and non-compliance easier to prove. The severity of the sanction can be high; 
premises can be put temporarily out of business, for example.
Interventions	relating	to	rule	Y
In particular, non-compliance of ATEX	rules; experience with enforcement of ATEX rules as 
yet limited.
Intervention relating to probability of reporting (T6)
•	 Covenants or agreements with insurance companies, certifying bodies, notified 
bodies to report back non-conformity with some elements of ATEX.
•	 Require and ask for reports on specific items from other (non-authority) bodies.
•	 Feeding back information and exchanging information between different inspectors 
(signalling function).
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•	 Advertising campaign targeting employees which focuses a on safe workers’ 
environment and the possibility to inform the competent authority.
•	 Promoting the establishment of safety committees within companies.
•	 Education of safety representatives of safety committees.
Intervention relating to acceptance of policy implementation (T3)
•	 Provide practical examples on implementation of non-electrical ignition sources.
•	 Give examples of accidents (warning function).
•	 Put pressure on equipment suppliers to provide useful, practical information to the 
end users.
•	 Agree on an approach with the industrial sector on how to tackle the issue of technical 
requirements in order to simplify this aspect for each individual operator.
•	 Authorities have to make clear what their own requirements and expectations are, 
and forward these to the sector organizations and the main consultants involved in 
the implementation of the regulation.
•	 Promote good examples of individual companies within the sector.
Intervention relating to clarity of the rules (T1)
•	 FAQs on authority website.
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Abstract
This report describes the outcome of a workshop (the Mutual Joint Visit for Seveso Inspections) 
hosted by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment of the Netherlands in November 2006  on 
“enforcement in Seveso II enterprises” in particular, a subject that has never been dealt with at EU 
level before.  The “Table of Eleven” was used as model in order to facilitate and encourage discus-
sion.  The Table of Eleven is a model based on behavioural sciences consisting of eleven dimensions, or 
factors, which are decisive for the level of compliance with legislation.  The use of the Table of Eleven 
requires the definition of and focus on “target groups” and “rules’’.  Five specific target groups were 
selected:  Mineral oil refineries, the pharmaceutical industry, fertilizer production, chemical batch 
processing, and LPG storage.  Five specific rules were selected:  1) “The requirement of submitting a 
notification” (ref. Article 6 sub 1); 2) “Major accident scenarios” (ref. Article 9 and Annex II sub IVa); 
3) “Assessment of the extent and severity of consequences” (ref. Article 9 and Annex II sub IVb); 4) 
“The identification of training needs” (ref. Article 7, 9 and Annex III sub c.i); and 5) “Procedures for 
management of change” (ref. Article 7, 9 and Annex III sub c.iv).  The workshops discussions produced 
several interesting and useful conclusions concerning the enforceability of the Seveso Directive in 
general, and differences in compliance drivers in different sectors and across the Member States.  On 
the basis of these conclusions, several recommendations were generated for European, national and 
inspectorate level regarding the improvement of enforcement strategies, tools and the results of the 
analyses performed in this workshop overall and by industry sector and by rule.
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The main purpose of the document is to provide a collection of knowledge representing the state of 
practice in the EU in the expectation that it will aid Seveso inspectors and inspections programmes in 
reviewing and improving their performance as appropriate.  It is understood that several approaches 
to controlling major hazards may be equally effective and the document is not offered as a definitive 
assessment of all possible options in this regard.  Moreover, the editors note that where informa-
tion is provided on a practice applied in a particular country it has been provided with the view that 
this might be useful descriptive information.  However, the document does not intend to represent 
a complete description of any one country’s inspection practices since they often differ internally 
between regions and sometimes between competent authorities who share Seveso inspection
responsibilities.
How to obtain EU publications
Our priced publications are available from EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu), where you can 
place an order with the sales agent of your choice.
The Publications Office has a worldwide network of sales agents. You can obtain their contact details 
by sending a fax to (352) 29 29-42758.
European Commission
EUR 23249  EN – Joint Research Centre – Institute for the 
Protection and Security of the Citizen
Title: Enforcement of Seveso II: An Analysis of Compliance Dri-
vers and Barriers in Five Industrial Sectors: 
Key Points and Conclusions. 
Mutual Joint Visit for Seveso Inspections, 
8-10 November 2006, 
The Hague, The Netherlands.
Editors: E. van der Stegen, M. Wood, L. Fabbri
